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ABSTRACT 
To secure information technology and telecommunications systems, the U.S Department 
of Homeland Security created the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team 
(U.S. CERT) to provide 24-hour early warning and detection for the federal 
government’s Internet infrastructure. A leading program in this effort, EINSTEIN, was 
developed by U.S. CERT in partnership with the National Security Agency (NSA) and 
private industry. EINSTEIN is an intrusion detection program that monitors network 
traffic and searches for signatures of known malicious code. Now in its third generation, 
EINSTEIN now generates alerts that have the possibility of including Personal 
Identifying Information, monitors live traffic on networks in real-time, and also has the 
ability to counter the intrusion as it takes place.  
By reviewing current privacy policy and past privacy case studies, in addition to 
careful analysis of federal court cases and statutes, this thesis establishes the fundamental 
and constitutional right to privacy. Through secondary research, this thesis identifies 
elements and exemptions of current communications legislation that can be used in the 
development of a comprehensive cyberspace monitoring policy. The result is a 
recommendation that a new Einstein III Privacy Impact Assessment, as well a new legal 
opinion document, be drafted to balance the trade-off between privacy rights and the 
objectives of securing cyberspace, and that establishes a proper legal foundation for the 
implementation of the controversial technology.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
In the years following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) was created to secure the nation from many threats. Among these threats, 
those of increasing significance were threats to the federal government’s computer 
network infrastructure and the computer network infrastructure of private sector 
companies that do business with government agencies. To address this growing issue 
several policy documents have been written and government structures created. However, 
the cybersecurity system is not working, attacks against federal networks have increased 
and information continues to flow out of federal systems and private companies, and 
critical infrastructure remains susceptible (Coldabella & White, 2010).  
A core DHS mission is to secure the key resources and critical infrastructure of 
the United States, including information technology and telecommunications systems, 
(Nojeim, 2010). To accomplish this DHS created the United Stated Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team (U.S. CERT) to provide 24-hour early watch warning and detection for 
the federal government’s Internet infrastructure, and the leading program in this effort, 
EINSTEIN, was developed by U.S. CERT in partnership with the National Security 
Agency (NSA) and private industry (Chertoff, 2008) 
Launched in 2004, EINSTEIN was meant to build and enhance national cyber-
related situational awareness, identify and respond to cyber threats and attacks, improve 
network security, increase the resiliency of critical, electronically delivered government 
services, and enhance the survivability of the Internet. EINSTEIN was also developed to 
satisfy security mandates created by the Homeland Security Act and the Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 7, and was intended to satisfy the Congressional 
requirements for information security outlined in the Federal Information Security 
Management Act (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004). 
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EINSTEIN monitors network traffic and searches for signatures of known 
malicious code. When a pre-defined signature is identified, EINSTEIN alerts to the 
possibility of a network intrusion. The signatures themselves do not contain privacy 
sensitive information, or Personally Identifiable Information (PII) as defined by the DHS 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2004). However, the alerts that the second generation 
program (EINSTEIN II), and third generation program (EINSTEIN III) generates for 
U.S. CERT may include PII as they have the ability to read the content of message 
traffic, not just addressing information  (Nojeim, 2010). Additionally, both the first and 
second versions of EINSTEIN monitored recorded copies of Internet traffic only, and 
only on the networks of participant government agencies. This meant that once malicious 
code was detected, the alert sent was merely a warning that an attack had already taken 
place (Nojeim, 2010). 
EINSTEIN III however, monitors live traffic on the network in real-time, and also 
has the ability to counter the intrusion as it takes place (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2010). Like the previous versions of EINSTEIN, EINSTEIN III relies on pre-
defined signatures of malicious code, but what is concerning is the combination of U.S. 
CERT’s plans to deploy EINSTEIN III inside the networks of private 
telecommunications companies, and its ability to capture not only the data of the message 
exchange event, but also the content of the connection as well (Nojeim, 2010). The 
EINSTEIN III Testing Exercise Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) gives as an example of 
this situation, an email in which the malicious code is contained in an attachment. In this 
situation, the PIA states that only the attachment, and not the content of the email, 
requires analysis. It does go on to say however, that, sometimes the malicious payload is 
hidden and delivered via the content (or body) of the email, and that in those cases, the 
analysis focuses only on the malicious payload, not on content, or PII contained in the 
content (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010). 
1. Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) 
Following the terrorist acts of September 11,
 
2001 the National Security Agency 
(NSA), working with private telecommunications companies, began eavesdropping on 
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communications between persons both in the United States and abroad when one of the 
communications participants was suspected of being an agent of Al Qaeda or another 
terrorist organization. The program, known as the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), 
aroused a sizeable amount of public objection as it seemingly violated The Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which requires a court order for such surveillance. 
Additionally, the TSP placed participating private sector companies in an extremely 
difficult position, exposing them to potential litigation (Nojeim, 2010). The public outcry 
over the suspected abuses of power during the TSP program has increased the scrutiny of 
programs like EINSTEIN, and makes careful examination of legal issues and privacy 
protection particularly important prior to their implementation. 
 
B. PURPOSE  
This thesis will offer an in-depth analysis of the existing DHS document, Privacy 
Impact Assessments for the EINSTEIN III.  It will examine strategies to address privacy 
concerns with the implementation of future EINSTEIN initiatives. In addition, this thesis 
will recommend the drafting of a new EINSTEIN III privacy policy, as well as a new 
legal opinion document that will balance the trade-off between privacy rights and the 
objectives of securing cyberspace. This is necessary to move forward with the 
implementation of this important network security system.  
C. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE 
By reviewing current privacy policy and past privacy case studies, in addition to 
careful analysis of federal court cases and statutes, this thesis will establish the 
fundamental and constitutional right to privacy. Through secondary research this thesis 
will identify elements and exemptions of current communications legislation that can be 
used in the development of cyberspace monitoring policy that establishes proper legal 
foundations for the implementation of the controversial technology.  
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D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What are the fundamental principles of U.S. citizen’s right to privacy? 
2. How can U.S.-CERT simultaneously guard against the abuse of privacy rights 
while also preventing network intrusion and exploitation though the 
collection, analysis, and dissemination of sensitive information? 
3. What protections should be put in place to prevent false identification and/or 
the initiation of actions against innocent system?  
E. BENEFIT OF THE STUDY 
Directors of all executive government agencies conducting cybersecurity 
operations will find this thesis useful in drafting policies and procedures to address 
privacy concerns in cyberspace. Moreover, the thesis will contribute to the body of 
literature addressing cybersecurity and privacy trade-offs by providing a comparative 
analysis of current government policies and current cybersecurity industry best practices. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
Research will first identify the right to privacy by exploring United States 
constitutional and case law. Next, the privacy concerns of leading civil rights 
organizations will be identified. A literature review will be conducted to gain a better 
understanding of current privacy and civil rights knowledge, and finally, changes to 
current EINSTEIN policy documents will be recommended.   
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II. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
1. Evolution of Privacy Laws  
The right to privacy is a fundamental human right and evidence of society’s 
attempts to protect it can be found in the statues, constitutions and court rulings of nearly 
every democratic nation (Solove, 2008). Privacy provides freedom from scrutiny, 
prejudice, pressure to conform, exploitation, and the judgment of others. It is a 
prerequisite for freedom, democracy, well-being, individualism and innovation  (DeCew, 
2008). 
The culture of privacy in the United States, and the rules and laws meant to 
protect it, are as old as the country itself. Early colonial American laws that dealt with 
privacy included those that protected, literally, against eavesdropping, which meant, to 
stand within the drip from the eaves of a house to listen secretly (Seipp, 1978). 
Additionally colonial american post services, which were under Brittish contol, were 
protected from privacy invasion by the Post Office Act of 1710. The act outlawed all but 
official tampering, or opening, of sealed mail (Lane, 2009). Of course, this led to an 
increase of official tampering, which most colonists viewed as an abuse of power. 
Additionally colonists viewed the colonial postal system as a tax, and chose to corresond 
via other means, or use shorthand or nicknames in their correspondence (Seipp, 1978).  
Our nation’s forefathers sought protections from excessive government power, 
and invasions of privacy, so, with the exception of the intelligence gathering via dead 
letters during the years of the Revolutionary War, Continental Congress’s provisional 
New American Post Office, established rules against the opening, detaining, delaying or 
destroying of letters (Seipp, 1978).  
Despite the evidence of these early attempts to protect the privacy of American 
citizens, some have argued that the right to privacy is not truly protected by the U.S. 
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Constitution because the subject is not specifically addressed in the documents text. 
Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, in his dissent to the court’s decision in Katz v. the 
United States argued that it was not the court’s place to, rewrite the (Fourth) Amendment 
in order to bring it into harmony with the times  (Katz v. United States). He stated: 
There can be no doubt that the Framers were aware of this practice, and, if 
they had desired to outlaw or restrict the use of evidence obtained by 
eavesdropping, I believe that they would have used the appropriate 
language to do so in the Fourth Amendment. They certainly would not 
have left such a task to the ingenuity of language-stretching judges. (Katz 
v. United States)  
There have been many precedent setting cases brought before the Supreme Court 
challenging the right to privacy since Katz, and all have upheld the decision that despite 
the changes in the technology that has surrounded the suspected invasions of privacy, a 
person is protected from unwanted eavesdropping. While the U.S. Constitution does not 
specifically outline the protection of privacy, it was the court’s decision then, and is still 
its decision today, that the protection is forged into the Bill of Rights; specifically via the 
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. Perhaps most specifically, the Fourth Amendment 
directly opposes government searches when a person has a, reasonable expectation of 
privacy (Solove, 2008).  
Analysis of federal court cases and statutes will establish the fundamental and 
constitutional right to privacy, and is necessary for the development of the proposed 
policies that the Department of Homeland Security should employ to bolster public 
confidence in their ability to moderate the trade-off between defending the nation’s 
system of computer networks, and protecting Fourth Amendment rights. Listed below are 
some of the most significant cases regarding the right to privacy in the United Stated, and 
these are followed by the federal statues that were derived from them.  
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B. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
1. First Amendment 
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is probably the most widely known 
amendment, but is unlikely to be recognized as protecting privacy (The Revolutionary 
War and Beyond, 2012). The First amendment’s primary intent is to protect the freedom 
of speech. It states: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the government for a redress of grievances. (U.S. Const. amend. 
I.) 
The Amendment protects privacy by protecting the ability of citizen’s to freely 
express themselves. If, for instance, a person knows that their private communications are 
being monitored, they would not likely feel free to engage in surreptitious speech, 
communicate openly, participate in political activities, or formulate original ideas, 
beliefs, and values. The First Amendment protects citizens from activities that prevent 
their freedom of speech and by extension their right to privacy (Solove, 2010). 
2. Third Amendment 
The Third Amendment protects the privacy of the home by preventing the 
requirement of citizens to house soldiers. It states: 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the 
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed 
by law (U.S. Const. amend. III).  
Like the First Amendment, the Third protects the autonomy of U.S. Citizens, and 
their ability to make decisions about their beliefs, thoughts and political associations in 
private. By preventing the requirement to house soldiers, the Third Amendment protects 
the privacy and autonomy of a person within their home by inhibiting possible 
survelliance by soldiers being housed there (Lane, 2009).    
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3. Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment, of all the amendments, is the one that most directly 
confronts the protection of privacy, as it safeguards citizens from unlimited search and 
seizures (U.S. Const. amend. V). It states: 
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
(U.S. Const. amend. IV).  
The Fourth Amendment serves as the structure upon which our current regulatory 
system for government information gathering is founded (Solove, 2010). The framers of 
the Constitution, could not have known that this single sentence would become the 
regulatory basis for all governmental information gathering, nor could they have forseeen 
the technological developments that would challenge it. The Amendment left many areas 
open for interpretation as new technologies arrived to challenge its protections of privacy, 
and the U.S. Supreme Court has attempted through the years to fill these voids with 
contitutional law. Today, all government information gathering activity requires that 
those searches be reasonable; meaning that they require a warrant supported by probable 
cause (Solove, 2010). By preventing unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fourth 
Amendment, and the regulatory system based on contitutional law, protects citizens’ 
privacy in their aural and electronic communications, as well as their person, house, or 
papers. 
4. Fifth Amendment 
The Fifth Amendment protects citizens from being compelled to testify self-
incriminating information, and guarantees the right to privacy with the Due Process 
clause. It says that a person:   
Shall [not] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. (U.S. Const. amend. V)  
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Like the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment seeks to protect privacy by 
extending the prevention of unreasonable searches and seizures of a person’s records that 
might be held by a third party. Its relevance in government surveillance is important to 
note when third party private telecommunications companies are compelled to release 
information pertaining to their subscribers. Additionally the Due Process clause, of the 
Amendment, prevents governmental abuse of power that might threaten a person’s 
liberty. This is accomplished through restrictions on the procedures the government can 
use in actions that might interfere with a person’s liberty. By providing nation-wide 
protection, the doctrine recognizes that no procedure can be just if it is being used to 
unjustly deprive a person of their fundamental human rights (Dondershine, 2012).  
5.  Ninth Amendment 
The Ninth Amendment can be viewed as being the universal amendment (Caplan, 
1983). Specifically it states that, the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people (U.S. Const. 
amend. IX.). Though the true meaning of the Ninth Amendment is vague, it has been 
interpreted in constitutional law as meaning a recognition that the Constitution is not an 
exhaustive listing of human rights, that additional fundamental rights, protected from 
governmental infringement, exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically 
mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments, and that no part of the 
constitution should be construed to infringe upon these implicit rights (Caplan, 1983). 
Because the concept of privacy is not specifically addressed directly in either the 
Constitution or the Bill of Rights, the Ninth Amendment is often used as the basis for 
extending the application of other Amendments to the existance and protection of the 




6. Fourteenth Amendment 
The Fourteenth Amendments extends the Fifth Amendments Due Process clause 
to state law and constitutes another key piece to the doctrinal framework from which the 
right of privacy can be found (Schneider, 1988). The specific text, found in section one of 
the Amendment states:  
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws 
(U.S. Const. amend. XIV.). 
The Fourteenth Amendment prevents state’s from drafting legislation that 
countermand protections of privacy provided for by the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights, and it has been used by the Supreme Court to uphold protections for basic family 
privacy rights such as marriage, family relationships, family planning, and child rearing 
(Foxman & Kilcoyne, 1993). 
C. CASE LAW 
1. Definition 
The legal system in the United States is based on the principle of precedence; a 
judicial doctrine that also serves as the analytical tool by which the rules of how to 
resolve legal disputes brought before the courts is guided (Kozel, 2010). Precedence 
means that the prior opinion of a court establishes the legal authority for future decision 
in court cases about the same legal questions; that if a court has already ruled on a given 
legal issue and another case arises with the same legal issue, the holding in the previous 
case will be applied to the new case (Hill & Hill, 2012). The practice of lower courts 
following a precedent is called stare decisis, which is Latin meaning, to stand by a 
decision (Hill & Hill, 2012). 
Precedence and stare decises establish what is known as Case Law, which is 
distinguished from Statutory Law, the statutes and codes enacted by legislative bodies, 
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Regulatory Laws, which are regulations required by agencies based on statutes, and 
Common Law, which is generally accepted law (Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts, 2012). The following precedent setting cases serve as evidence of the Supreme 
Courts opinion that a person is protected from unwanted eavesdropping, and that every 
U.S. Citizen has a fundamental right to privacy. 
2. Ex Parte Jackson 
Protecting the privacy of citizens’ communications is not a new concept. As early 
as 1782, laws were passed to prevent letter mail from being opened by unauthorized 
persons (Solove, 2006). Later in 1877, communications privacy was addressed by the 
Supreme Court in the case Ex parte Jackson. Here the Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment prohibited government officials from opening letters without a warrant. 
They found that the amendment’s guarantee that a person be secure in their papers 
against unreasonable searches and seizures was a guarantee not dependent on those 
papers being located inside the confines of a person’s house; that the guarantee extends to 
their papers wherever they may be (Solove, 2006). 
As with many laws, constitutional laws protecting privacy are not the application 
of abstract principles to specific facts, but are codified rules that are born of socially held 
beliefs and customs of proper behavior. Here the constitutional principle of 
communications privacy was the affirmation of long-standing law and custom, 
represented in the practices of the post office (Desai, 2007). The Fourth Amendment did 
not, on its own, give us the notion of communications privacy, but that that notion was a 
common held notion among the people; Ex parte Jackson effectively constitutionalized 
this notion. Today, we recognize that regardless of the technology used in our 
communications; be it a telephone conversation, emails, text or tweet; we expect that the 
constitutional principle of communications privacy be applied to it. Ex parte Jackson 




Since Ex parte Jackson, many cases have shaped the laws surrounding the 
principle of communications privacy. In a 1960 survey of over 300 of these cases, 
renowned tort scholar William Prosser concluded that the cases recognized four distinct 
torts (Prosser, 1960): 
 
(1) intrusion upon seclusion 
(2) public disclosure of private facts 
(3) false light or publicity 
(4) appropriation  
Of these, the tort of intrusion upon seclusion seems most relevant to 
communications privacy, as approached in the case of the EINTSTEIN III Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS), because protections from intrusions upon seclusion are meant to 
protect against electronic eavesdropping into conversations in the home (Solove, 2006). 
As defined by the Restatement of Torts, intrusion upon seclusion is committed by: 
 One, who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the 
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is 
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person (Harvard University, 
2012).  
Although it is unclear whether evidence obtained via EINSTEIN can be used in a 
trial, the technology does still seem to intrude upon the seclusion of the victim, and the 
intrusion itself makes the defendant subject to liability, even though there is no 
publication or other use of any kind of the information outlined (Harvard University, 
2012). 
3. Olmstead v. United States  
In 1928, in Olmstead v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether 
wiretapping would be covered by the Fourth Amendment or left unregulated (Solove, 
2006). The case involved Roy Olmstead a suspected bootlegger who was convicted in the 
Western District of Washington of a conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act by 
unlawfully possessing, transporting, importing and selling intoxicating liquors. His arrest, 
and subsequent conviction, was based on evidence gained through wiretaps in the 
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basement of his building and in the streets near his home that were placed without 
judicial approval. Olmstead argued that the wiretaps were a violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights, and therefore the evidence gained by them should be thrown out 
(Olmstead v. United States).The Supreme Court however, upheld the conviction, 
concluding that the Fourth Amendment did not cover wiretapping because there was no 
entry of the houses or offices of the defendants (Solove, 2006). 
Justice Louis Brandeis dissented to the Court’s decision, arguing that new 
technological developments necessitated revising traditional views of the Fourth 
Amendment in order to preserve its purpose of protecting privacy (Solove, 2006). He 
believed that the Court’s threshold test for determining Fourth Amendment coverage was 
narrow-minded and antiquated, and that the Fourth Amendment should be able to be 
adapted to apply to whatever technological means is being used to threaten the protection 
of privacy (Olmstead v. United States). He stated: 
 Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have 
become available to the government. Discovery and invention have made 
it possible for the government, by means far more effective than stretching 
upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the 
closet (Olmstead v. United States). 
4. Katz v. United States 
In 1967, almost forty years after Olmstead, the Court finally embraced Justice 
Brandeis’s opinion when it overruled the Olmstead decision in the case Katz v. United 
States. In this case Federal agents attached an eavesdropping device to the outside of a 
public phone booth used by Katz on suspicion that he was transmitting gambling 
information over the phone to clients in other states. Based on the evidence obtained, 
Katz was convicted for the illegal transmission of wagering information. On appeal, Katz 
challenged his conviction arguing that the recordings could not be used as evidence 
against him based on his Fourth Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals however, 
rejected this point, noting the absence of a physical intrusion into the phone booth itself 
(Katz v. United States). This decision gave birth to the Court’s current approach to 
determining whether the Fourth Amendment applies, the reasonable expectation of 
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privacy test. According to the Court, the overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is 
to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State 
(Solove, 2010). The reasonable expectation of privacy test articulated in Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence, asks whether: 
 
(1) a person exhibits an actual or subjective expectation of privacy and 
(2) the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable 
(Solove, 2006) 
 
The reasonable expectation of privacy test transforms the Amendment from 
outdated formalistic considerations, and re-focuses it on the basic principles of a right to 
privacy, no matter the domain of the trespass. The reasonable expectation of privacy test 
creates in the Fourth Amendment, the flexibility to evolve with society and remain 
connected to current social values (Solove, 2010).  
5. Couch v. United States 
In the 1973 case, Couch v. United States, the petitioner (Couch) challenged that 
an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) summons directing her accountant to produce her 
(Couch’s) business records. Couch claimed that the summons violated her Fifth 
Amendment right to prevent self-incrimination because the business records belonged to 
her, not her accountant. The District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that the 
privilege against self-incrimination asserted by the petitioner was not available because 
she had effectively surrendered possession of the records to the accountant, and that there 
was no personal compulsion against her to produce the records personally. The Court 
found that the Fifth Amendment therefore constituted no bar to the production of the 
records by the accountant. Nor did the petitioner (Couch) have any legitimate expectation 
of privacy that would bar the production of the records (Couch v. United States). The 
Court determined that personal records maintained by third parties were not protected by 
the Fifth Amendment (Solove, 2006).  
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6. Smith v. Maryland 
In the 1979 case, Smith v. Maryland, the victim (McDonough) was robbed, and 
after cooperating with the police, began receiving threatening phone calls from the robber 
(Smith). The telephone company, at police request, installed at its central offices a pen 
register to record the numbers dialed from the telephone at the petitioner’s (Smith) home. 
Prior to his trial, Smith moved to suppress all fruits derived from the pen register on the 
grounds that it violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The Maryland trial court denied 
this motion, holding that the warrantless installation of the pen register did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment because it could not be applied to a list of the telephone numbers a 
person dials, as people, know that they must convey numerical information to the phone 
company and that the phone company records this information for billing purposes, 
therefore people cannot, harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will 
remain secret (Solove, 2006). On this basis Smith was convicted, and the Maryland Court 
of Appeals affirmed (Smith v. Maryland).  
7. Doe v. Ashcroft/Gonzales/Mukasey/Holder 
In 2004, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a lawsuit on behalf of 
a John Doe Internet Service Provider who had been served with a Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (FBI) National Security Letter (NSL). The lawsuit challenged whether the 
FBI had the authority to demand records and whether they could demand that NSL 
recipients be gagged from discussing record demands (American Civil Liberties Union, 
2009). 
In September 2004, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ injunction but ordered 
a brief stay to allow the Government to appeal. The Second Circuit extended the stay, and 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, sitting as Circuit Justice, affirmed the extension (Nieland, 
2007) (Jansen, 2006). 
In March 2006, with the government appeal of the district court’s September 2004 
decision pending, Congress amended the Patriot Act to permit NSL recipients to consult a 
lawyer and seek judicial review of the letter’s validity (Nieland, 2007). The amended Act 
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also modified the secrecy requirement permitting the FBI to continue to gag NSL 
recipients indefinitely. However, under the amended Patriot Act, the FBI would have to 
certify that the requirements for secrecy exist and recertify annually if the recipient 
challenges the necessity (Nieland, 2007). 
In May 2006, the appeals court sent the case back to the district court to consider 
the constitutionality of the amended gag provisions, and in September 2007, the district 
court struck down the entirety of the NSL provisions of the Amended Patriot Act, ruling 
that the NSL statute’s gag provisions violate the First Amendment right to free speech 
(American Civil Liberties Union, 2009) (Doe v. Gonzales, 2007). 
In August 2009, after reviewing secret documents submitted by the government in 
an attempt to justify the continuation of the gag on Doe, the court ordered the government 
to partially disclose its secret filing and to release a public summary of its evidence (Doe 
v. Holder, 2009). Two months later, the district court ruled that the government could 
continue to enforce the five-year-old gag order on Doe and that the FBI could continue to 
suppress an attachment to the NSL Doe received (Doe v. Holder, 2009). Following this 
the ACLU filed a motion for reconsideration, and in March 2010, the Court ordered the  
government to release a less-redacted version of the attachment to the NSL issued to John 
Doe, but ruled that the government could continue to suppress certain information about 
the types of records the FBI demanded (Doe v. Holder, 2010). Five months later, in 
August 2010, the case was settled and the FBI lifted the gag on John Doe, who was then 
identified as Nick Merrill, president of New York-based Calyx Internet Access (Zetter, 
2010). 
D. FEDERAL ACTS 
1. Definition 
Federal Acts are Statutory Law, and are statutes and codes enacted by legislative 
bodies (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 2012). In the United States, Statutory 
law are passed by Congress and approved by the President. Federal Acts are either: 
Public Law, relating to the general public, or Private Law, relating to specific institutions 
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or individuals (Brown & Williams, 2012).  Most laws passed by Congress however, are 
public laws and these are the laws that apply to the right to privacy. The following 
sections examine key Federal Acts that form the legal protections meant to preserve the 
right to privacy.   
2. Federal Communications Act  
In 1934, six years after Olmstead, Congress enacted the Federal Communications 
Act (Solove, 2006). The Act combined and organized federal regulations covering 
telephone, telegraph, and radio communications, and created the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) to oversee and regulate these industries. As new 
communications technologies have been created, such as broadcast, cable, and satellite 
television, new provisions governing these communications have been added to the Act 
(47 U.S.C. 151, 1934)Of particular interest to the principle of communications privacy 
are the acts requirements that common carriers establish procedures to allow appropriate 
authorization to activate interception of communications or access to call-identifying 
information and to maintain secure and accurate records of any interception or access 
with or without such authorization (47 U.S.C. 151, 1934). 
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act provides for Fourth Amendment 
protection as it states: 
No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any 
communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, 
purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communications to any 
person (47 U.S.C. 151, 1934). 
 However, the statute only applied to federal, not state, officials. According to the 
Supreme Court, section 605 prohibited evidence obtained by wiretapping from being 
used in court, but the statute did not restrict officials from engaging in wiretapping, only 
from disclosing intercepted communications in court proceedings (Solove, 2006).  
Additionally, Section 606 provides for suspension or amendment of these rules 
and regulations by the president upon proclamation that there exists a war or a threat of a 
war or state of public peril or disaster or other national emergency if he deems it 
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necessary in the interests of national security or defense (47 U.S.C. 151, 1934). The 
president may prioritize defense or security communications, authorize government use 
or control of communications facilities, and suspend or amend rules and regulations 
applicable to any or all stations or devices capable of emitting electromagnetic radiations 
(47 U.S.C. 151, 1934).  
3. Freedom of Information Act (1966) 
In 1966 The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was enacted to amend the 
Public Information section of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA, in a 
reflection of governmental thought on records collection at the time, primarily provided 
for the withholding of government information, not its disclosure. The FOIA reversed 
this, and ushered in an era of full government disclosure, provided that the information 
being sought was not exempted under clearly delineated statutory language (Duke Law 
Journal, 1973). Specifically the Act states, that, each agency, upon request for records 
which reasonably describes such records and  is made in accordance with published 
rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the 
records promptly available to any person. (5 U.S.C. 552, 1966).   
There are however, several exemptions to the disclosure requirements of the 
FOIA. The exemptions cover, among other things, national defense secrets, trade secrets, 
certain investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, and certain inter- 
and intra-agency memoranda (5 U.S.C. 552, 1966). Of the Act’s nine original 
exemptions, the sixth and seventh specifically seek to protect individual privacy. The 
sixth exemption states that the act’s disclosure requirements do not apply to, personnel 
and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and the seventh exemption excludes the 
requirement to disclose, records or information compiled for law enforcement 
purposes…which could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of 




subject of considerable litigation and scholarly commentary, and ultimately led to the 
enactment of the Privacy Act of 1974, which is widely viewed as an amendment to FOIA 
(Duke Law Journal, 1973). 
4. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (1968) 
In the years following the Supreme Court’s Decision in Katz, Congress expanded 
protections against electronic surveillance beyond the limited protections of the Federal 
Communications Act with the introduction of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act. Title III extended the reach of wiretap regulations to state officials as 
well as to private parties. Despite these expanded protections it still only applied to the 
interception of aural communications; not to visual surveillance or other forms of 
electronic communication (Solove, 2006). 
However, in its presently amended form, Title III does cover more than aural 
communications. Specifically it: (42 U.S.C.  3789D, 1968) 
 prohibits the unauthorized, nonconsensual interception of wire, oral, or electronic 
communications by government agencies as well as private parties, 
 establishes procedures for obtaining warrants to authorize wiretapping by 
government officials, and 
 regulates the disclosure and use of authorized intercepted communications by 
investigative and law enforcement officers  
There are some exceptions to the Act’s protections however. The Act provides 
exceptions for operators and service providers for uses in the normal course of (their) 
employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition 
of (their) service and for persons authorized by law to intercept wire, oral, or electronic 
communications or to conduct electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (42 U.S.C. 3789D, 1968). Additionally 
there is an exception to the requirement that government officials obtain a warrant before 
intercepting covered communications where: 
Any investigative or law enforcement officer, specially designated by the 
Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney 
General, or by the principal prosecuting attorney of any State or 
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subdivision thereof acting pursuant to a statute of that state reasonably 
determines that an emergency situation exists that involves (42 U.S.C. 
3789D, 1968). 
1. immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person, 
2. conspiratorial activities threatening the national security interest, or 
3. conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime 
5. Privacy Act of 1974 
In 1973 the Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) issued a report 
titled, Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, which analyzed the growing 
problem of personal information being collected and maintained by government agencies. 
The report recommended the passage of a code of Fair Information Practices, to prevent 
secret personal data record-keeping systems, provide individuals a means to find out what 
information about them is in a record and how it is used, and to allow an individual to 
prevent personal information from being obtained for one purpose and then be used or 
made available for other purposes without consent (Solove, 2006).  
A year after the HEW report’s recommendations, Congress passed the Privacy 
Act of 1974. The Act responded to many of the concerns raised by the HEW report, 
including regulation of the collection and use of records by federal agencies, and it 
established the right of individuals to access and correct personal information. The Act 
states that: (Solove, 2006). 
No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of 
records by any means of communication to any person, or to another 
agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written 
consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains. 
The Act does however, have some shortcomings, first of which is that it does not 
apply to the private sector, state or local agencies. The Act also provides exceptions to 
the non-disclosure specification which include, but are not limited to, the permissible 
disclosure of records to, agency employees maintaining records in the performance of 
their duties, the Census Bureau, persons using records for statistical reasons, national 
archiving, and to both houses of Congress  (5 U.S.C. 552a, 1974).  
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The most contentious of the act’s shortcomings however, is the routine use 
exception, where information may be disclosed for any routine use if disclosure is 
compatible with the purpose for which the agency collected the information (Solove, 
2006). The routine use exception states that:  
A record may be disclosed, for a routine use, where the term routine use 
means; with respect to the disclosure of a record, the use of such record 
for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was 
collected.  (5 U.S.C. § 552a, 1974) 
By definition, the use does not have to be for a purpose identical to the purpose 
for which the record was collected, only a compatible purpose, and this phrasing has led 
to uses of system of records in which the original routine uses for a particular database 
gradually increases until its scope is far beyond their originally stated goals (Electronic 
Privacy Information Center, 2012). In this way, the routine use exemption of the 1974 
Privacy Act has been widely employed by agencies to allow disclosure of records without 
written consent of individuals (Straub & Collins, 1990). 
6. Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA (1978) 
In 1978 Congress enacted the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA. FISA 
differs from Title III regulations in that it does not apply to electronic surveillance for 
domestic law enforcement purposes as Title III does; FISA is applicable when the 
purpose of the surveillance is to gather foreign intelligence. FISA permits electronic 
surveillance and covert searches pursuant to court orders issued after a review by a 
special court of seven federal judges, the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). 
Under FISA, orders are granted if there is probable cause to believe that the monitored 
party is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, and there is a showing of 
probable cause that the surveillance will uncover evidence of criminal activity (Solove, 
2006). FISA protections are not as strong as the protections under Title III, and evidence 
obtained via surveillance permitted by FISC orders can be used in criminal trials. 
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7. Cable Communications Policy Act (CCPA) 
In 1984 congress passed the Cable Communications Policy Act (CCPA) to protect 
the privacy of cable records. The Act protects the personal information of cable service 
provider customers, states that a cable company must notify subscribers about the 
collection and use of personal information, and that cable companies cannot disclose a 
subscriber’s viewing habits (University of Miami, 2012) (Solove, 2006). 
The CCPA does have a rather large exception, in that consent is not required to 
obtain information necessary to render cable services, nor is it required for information 
used to detect unauthorized reception (University of Miami, 2012). The CCPA 
specifically includes such other services as radio and wire communications, so it 
presumably applies to the personal use information of cable broadband Internet customer. 
However, the provisions of the CCPA probably will not apply to Direct Broadcast 
Satellite (DBS) companies that provide similar Internet services (University of Miami, 
2012). 
8. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, ECPA 
The older Wiretap Act, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, was originally written to address the interception of communications made 
via telephone lines. However, technological advances of many years mandated an update 
(Solove, 2006). As a result, Congress updated wiretapping law by modifying Title III. 
The resulting act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986, 
expanded Title III to focus on new forms of communications, specifically those involving 
computers (Solove, 2006). The ECPA, as presently amended, protects wire, oral, and 
electronic communications while those communications are being made, are in transit, or 
when they are being stored on computers. The Act applies to email, telephone 
conversations, and data stored electronically (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 
Justice Programs, 2012). The ECPA has three titles: Title I, known as the New Wiretap 
Act, regulates the interception of communications. Title II, referred to as the Stored 
Communications Act, protects the privacy of the contents of files stored by service 
providers and of records held about their subscribers, such as subscribers names, billing 
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records, or IP addresses. Title III addresses the requirement of government entities to 
obtain a court order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register and/or trap and 
trace device (18 U.S.C. 2510–22, 1986). 
Title I provides the same exceptions as did its predecessor, Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. Here too, operators and service providers 
were authorized to monitor their customers, for uses in normal activity necessary to the 
rendition of service and for persons authorized by law to intercept wire, oral, or 
electronic communications or to conduct electronic surveillance, as defined in section 
101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, FISA.  Additionally, Title I 
provides procedures for Federal, State, and other government officers to obtain judicial 
authorization for intercepting such communications, and regulates the use and disclosure 
of information obtained through authorized wiretapping. The exception also states that a 
judge may issue a warrant authorizing interception of communications for up to 30 days 
upon a showing of probable cause that the interception will reveal evidence that an 
individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense (18 
U.S.C. 2510–22, 1986). 
9. Computer Matching and Privacy Act 
In 1988 Congress passed the Computer Matching and Privacy Act to address an 
exception issues with the routine use clause of the 1974 Privacy Act. The Privacy Act 
stated that, a government agency can disclose private information without a written 
request by, or the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains, if 
disclosure of the record would be for a routine use, which was defined as use for a 
purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected (5 U.S.C.  552a, 
1974). 
As a means of detecting fraud, the federal government used this exception as the 
legal bases for running computer comparisons of employee records with the records of 
people receiving benefits, a practice known as computer matching (Solove, 2006). The 
Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988 amended the Privacy Act to 
include procedural requirements for computer-matching activities, provide matching 
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subjects the opportunity to receive notice and to refute adverse information before having 
a benefit denied or terminated, additionally it required that agencies engaged in matching 
activities establish Data Protection Boards to oversee those activities (54 FR 25818, 
1988). 
The Act states that each agency that proposes to establish or make a significant 
change in a system of records, or a matching program, must provide adequate advance 
notice of the establishment or modification to the Committee on Government Operations 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, 
and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in order to permit an evaluation of the 
probable or potential effect of such proposal on the privacy or other rights of individual 
(54 FR 25818, 1988). In essence the law establishes procedures for computer matching 
activities, but does not prevent the practice (Solove, 2006). 
10. USA PATRIOT Act 
In reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, or USA PATRIOT Act. The Act loosened 
restrictions on federal officials’ ability and authority to track and intercept 
communications for law enforcement and foreign intelligence gathering purposes, 
provided the Department of the Treasury regulatory powers to counter financial 
institution corruptions, and sought to tighten U.S. borders against foreign terrorists. 
Additionally the Act creates new crimes, new penalties, and new procedural efficiencies 
for use against domestic and international terrorists (U.S. Library of Congress, 2002). 
The USA PATRIOT Act expanded the definition of pen registers and trap-and-
trace devices established in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) to apply 
to addressing information on emails and to IP addresses. The Act expanded the 
circumstances under which the FBI could issue a National Security Letter (NSL), created 
new justifications for delayed notice of search warrants, and broadened the spectrum 
under which communications service provider subscriber records could be obtained 
(Nieland, 2007)(Solove, 2006). The Act made legal, roving wiretaps under FISA, 
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updating the law to reflect new technologies and new threats by allowing law 
enforcement officials to obtain a search warrant anywhere a terrorist-related activity 
occurred, and allowed victims of computer hacking to request law enforcement assistance 
in monitoring the trespassers on their computers (Solove, 2006)(U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2012). 
11. REAL ID Act of 2005 
Continued reactions to the September 11, 2001 terrorist acts led to the passage of 
the REAL ID Act in 2005 (Culotta & Fredrickson, 2007). The Act requires all Federal 
agencies to accept, for any official purpose, only those driver’s licenses or identification 
cards issued by a state whose credentials comply with technical standards issued by the 
Department of Homeland Security. These standard’s dictate how the state’s issue driver’s 
licenses, and defines in some detail what information those licenses must contain 
(Froomkin, 2007). Restrictions to those not carrying a properly credentialed card  include 
domestic air travel and access to service benefits such as Social Security (Froomkin, 
2007). 
Although the cards are not federally issued, some see them as the beginning 
stages of the government building a central database for the collection of private 
information (Froomkin, 2007). The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) believes that 
information in the databases will be used in a widening range of surveillance activities by 
government and businesses to access private information more easily. The American 
Civil Liberties Union believes that the databases will provide a one-stop shop for identity 
thieves, and others believe that the Act’s requirement that the cards contain Machine 
Readable Technology, such as Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags, would allow 
for routine tracking, monitoring and regulating of citizen’s movements and activities, 
because the RFID tags can be scanned from a distance (McLaughlin, 2007)(Smith, 
2007)(Govindaiah, 2006). Additionally, since the cards contain both an individual’s 
picture and date of birth, they have the potential to become de facto forms of 
identification used for many non-governmental transactions as well, such as entering a  
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bar, purchasing cigarettes or alcohol, or writing a check. This is a serious privacy concern 
because it makes it possible for those private transactions to be recorded, and stored 
(Govindaiah, 2006). 
Proponents of the Act’s card requirements say that the Act is not a mandate; that 
no state has to comply, but that those states that do not comply, cannot expect that their 
licenses will be accepted for federal purposes (McLaughlin, 2007). Others advocate the 
the use of imprinted barcodes to satisfy the Act’s Machine Readable requirments because 
barcode readers interpret widths and heights to decode the stored data; therefore, 
requiring the holder to voluntarily pass the barcode through a scanner before the 
information contained can be attained. The argument here is that the inability to scan 
barcodes from a distance provides a level of security that protects privacy interests 
(Govindaiah, 2006). Additionally, some have stated that if RFID technology is to be 
used, the devices should employ encryption protection to directly affect privacy of the 
data stored (Govindaiah, 2006). 
12. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12, (HSPD 12) 
Similar to the REAL ID Act, HSPD 12 established a mandatory, Government-
wide standard for secure and reliable forms of identification for Federal Government 
employees and contractors (Presidential Directive 12, 2004). The Directive calls for 
Secure and reliable forms of identification that is issued based on sound criteria for 
verifying an individual employee’s identity, is strongly resistant to identity fraud, 
tampering, counterfeiting, and terrorist exploitation, can be rapidly authenticated 
electronically and  is issued only by providers whose reliability has been established by 
an official accreditation process (Presidential Directive 12, 2004). An underlying goal of 
HSPD 12 is to protect the Federal Government’s Internet infrastructure and computer 
systems against viruses and their potential to provide unauthorized access (Dasgupta, 
Chatha, & Gupta, 2007). 
In response to HSPD 12, the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) developed Federal Information Processing Standard Publication (FIPS PUB) 201 
on Personal Identity Verification (PIV) (Karger, 2006). FIPS PUB 201 defines two kinds 
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of Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards: PIV-I and PIV-II. (Karger, 2006). The 
difference being that the PIV-II cards are to incorporate smart card chips similar to the 
RFID chips in use on cards issued under the REAL ID Act. Printed on each PIV card will 
be the cardholder’s name, photograph, the cardholder’s organization, a serial number, an 
expiration date, and a variety of other agency-specific information. Data on the smart 
card chip includes, personal identification number (PIN) known by the card holder, a 
Card Holder Unique Identifier (CHUID), PIV authentication data consisting of an 
asymmetric key pair and corresponding certificate, and two biometric fingerprints 
(Karger, 2006). 
The card will contain both contact smart card and contactless smart card 
interfaces. The contactless interfaces, like RFID chips, communicate over radio 
communications and are powered by transmissions from the reader itself, and like the 
RFID chip requires that the cardholder only be near the reader to have the information 
read (Karger, 2006). 
E. SUMMARY 
There have been many precedent setting cases brought before the Court 
challenging the right to privacy, and they all have led to the ultimate conclusion that, 
despite changes in technology, a person’s privacy should be protected by law. Although 
the U.S. Constitution does not specifically outline the protection of privacy, the statutes, 
acts and court decisions of the last 200 years provide protections where a citizen has a, 
reasonable expectation of privacy (Solove, 2008). These many decisions, though not 
perfect, serve as the framework upon which all new privacy law or policy should be built. 
In this way, privacy policy can be conceptualized, and prevented from being bogged 
down and befuddled by the manifold complexities surrounding the issue of privacy itself 
(Solove, 2008). DHS policy drafters must incorporate, more densely, this historical 
privacy framework in their policies. Doing so will strengthen public confidence in their 
ability to moderate the trade-off between defending the nation’s system of computer 
networks, and protecting privacy rights.  
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If the DHS’s Privacy Impact Assessments for the Initiative three Exercise 
(EINSTEIN) is to be improved, its drafters must also address specific privacy concerns 
head-on. New technologies such as the EINSTEIN III IDS will, no doubt, continue to 
bring about questions surrounding privacy, and while it is true that no amount of 
research, policy or legal precedent will ever be the final answer to the question of 
privacy, the past must be deeply ingrained in future solutions (Solove, 2008). 
Incorporating answers to as many specific privacy concerns as possible is essential for 
public acceptance of such invasive technologies, and is what has to be done in all future 
policy documents surrounding the EINSTEIN III, IDS. A few of the most critical of these 
specific concerns are presented in the next section. 
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III. PRIVACY CONCERNS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The original version of EINSTEIN, EINSTEIN I, was an automated process for 
collecting, correlating, analyzing, and sharing computer security information across the 
Federal civilian government to increase awareness, in near real-time, of the threats to its 
infrastructure. EINSTEIN I sought to address common security weaknesses and promote 
the cyber security of government systems by providing worm detection, the ability to 
detect anomalous network activity, configuration management and trend analysis. 
EINSTEIN I worked by monitoring the network traffic of individual Internet users who 
browse, read pages, download information or otherwise communicate with a Federal 
Government (.gov) website (Department of Homeland Security, 2004). The security and 
network information about these transactions was collected and analysis conducted to 
provide situational awareness for Federal agencies concerning the state of Internet traffic 
across the Federal Government (.gov) domain. The information to be collected was only 
to be that which would be needed for analysis, and not interfere with the communications 
to and from agencies (Department of Homeland Security, 2004). Additionally, 
EINSTEIN I only collected data that would enable anomaly detection and other 
information technology risks, not personally identifiable information. These data were 
later identified as network flow records, and included data such as: source and destination 
IP address; source and destination port; the IP protocol; and associated derived metrics 
such as timing information and traffic volumes (Department of Homeland Security, 
2008). No packet payload was stored in the flow records (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2004).  
The follow-on version of EINSTEIN, EINSTEIN II, relied on commercially 
available intrusion detection capabilities that used a set of pre‐defined signatures based 
upon known malicious network traffic, not personally identifiable information (PII). Nor 
was the IDS programmed to specifically collect or locate PII. Although EINSTEIN II did 
not seek or obtain the content of electronic communications, it was acknowledged that 
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future signatures might be developed in response to threats that use what appears to be 
PII, that the purpose of those signatures would be developed to prevent malicious activity 
from reaching federal networks, not to collect or locate PII (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2008).  
EINSTEIN III intends to use a modified version of EINSTEIN I and EINSTEIN II, 
as well as a DHS test deployment of technology developed by the National Security Agency 
(NSA) that includes intrusion prevention capabilities. Additionally, EINSTEIN III proposes 
to demonstrate the ability of an existing Internet Service Provider, which would be 
designated as a Trusted Internet Connection Access Provider (TICAP), to select and redirect 
Internet traffic from a single participating government agency through EINSTEIN III 
technology (Nakashima, 2009). By doing so, U.S. CERT would be able to apply intrusion 
detection and prevention measures and generate automated alerts about selected cyber 
threats. All traffic handled by the TICAP that would be associated with the supplied IP 
addresses for the participating agency would be redirected to EINSTEIN III technology, and 
in that traffic there will be information that could be considered PII (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2010). 
Concerns surrounding the privacy implications of the EINSTEIN III program, and 
pending legislation that appears to lay the legal groundwork for it, are well documented. 
Of the many questions surrounding the project those about the involvement of the 
National Security Agency (NSA) are most prominent, as many have concerns about the 
clandestine organization being permitted to use its computing and analytical powers to 
monitor the content of private Internet communications (Goldsmith, 2008). Private 
individuals and civil rights organizations are specifically concerned with potential capture 
of communications that have been mistakenly directed to systems under the protections 
of EINSTEIN III, the potential misuse of personal information that may be captured, the 
effects of such monitoring on free speech, and the possibility of monitored traffic being 
used as evidence in a court of law (Center For Democracy & Technology, 2009). 
Questions surrounding EINSTEIN III and pending legislation vary, but the theme 
that underpins most concerns is that the program’s secrecy alone undermines the 
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effectiveness of cybersecurity efforts, especially where the government is cooperating 
with private sector companies (Center For Democracy & Technology, 2009). In attempts 
to lift the veil of secrecey, several privacy and civil rights advocates have challenged the 
legitimacy of recent cybersecurity regulations and policies (Shaw, 2010). Of these the 
most active organizations are the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), the 
Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), and the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU). The overwhelming majority of cases come from EPIC, despite the ACLU’s 
long history in civil rights issues. This is likely due to EPIC’s concentration on 
cyberspace, while the ACLU has a wider civil liberties mandate that covers a greater 
scope than just issues involving electronics (Shaw, 2010). 
B. ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER (EPIC) 
1. Background 
The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) is a non-partisan public 
interest research organization established in 1994. EPIC’s mission is to focus 
public attention on emerging privacy and civil liberties issues, with specific regard to 
computer security, privacy, and identification. Since its inception, EPIC has participated 
in numerous public debates regarding the protection of privacy rights on the Internet and 
elsewhere (Planning for the Future of Cyber Attack Attribution, 2010). EPIC’s primary 
weapon in the fight for cyber privacy rights has been there use of Freedom of Information 
Act requests, and litigation when those requests have gone unanswered. As previously 
reviewed, The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of 1966 was enacted to amend the 
Public Information section of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which primarily 
provided for the withholding of government information, not its disclosure (Duke Law 
Journal, 1973). The era of full government disclosure, provided by the FOIA, has been 
responsible for uncovering numerous cases of government fraud and abuse since its 
inception. (Rotenberg, McCall, & Stepanovich, 2012) 
Several successful EPIC FOIA cases highlight its ability to successfully employ 
FOIA requests and litigation to force disclosure of agency records (Why Isn’t The 
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Department Of Homeland Security Meeing The President’s Standard On FOIA, 2011). In 
a statement read before the Senate Judiciary Committee in March 2012, EPIC stated that: 
(Rotenberg, McCall, & Stepanovich, 2012) 
It is important that the NSA provide to the public, at a minimum, the legal 
basis of its authority to conduct cybersecurity within the United States. As 
we have repeatedly stressed in our filings, we simply cannot accept a 
doctrine of secret law in the United States for such a critical government 
function. 
In regard to EINSTEIN, EPIC seeks disclosure that it hopes will shed light on the 
NSA’s role in network monitoring, inadvertent capture of innocent communications, the 
potential misuse of personal information, the impact on free speech, and the 4th 
Amendment implications surrounding EINSTEIN, other cybersecurity related programs, 
and pending legislation in support of those initiatives (Rotenberg, McCall, & 
Stepanovich, 2012).  A few of EPIC’s more prominent attempts at seeking disclosure 
via FOIA requests are investigated below. 
2. EPIC–Freedom of Information Act Requests & Litigation 
EPIC is engaged in active litigation under the Freedom of Information Act with 
the NSA and National Security Council regarding National Security Presidential 
Directive 54, and EINSTEIN III (Planning for the Future of Cyber Attack Attribution, 
2010).    Between January 2009 and March 2012, EPIC pursued seven Freedom of 
Information Act requests with the NSA concerning cybersecurity operations. In six of 
those cases, the NSA did not disclose documents requested, ignored deadlines or 
refused to comply with required procedures, leading to FOIA Litigation (Rotenberg, 
McCall, & Stepanovich, 2012).  
a. National Security Presidential Directive 54, FOIA 
On June 25, 2009, EPIC submitted a Freedom of Information Act request 
to the NSA requesting the National Security Presidential Directive 54 (NSPD 54). NSPD 
54, formalized the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), a 
multiagency, multiyear plan that lays out twelve steps to securing the federal 
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government’s cyber networks, authorizes DHS, together with Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), to establish minimum operational standards for Federal Executive 
Branch civilian networks in support of U.S. CERT’s directing the operation and defense 
of government connections to the Internet (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2010a). The CNCI consists of a number of mutually reinforcing initiatives with goals 
designed to help secure the United States in cyberspace; one of goals is to deploy an 
intrusion detection system of sensors across the Federal enterprise, and this goal is to be 
met with EINSTEIN (National Security Council, 2012). As of March 2012, neither 
NSPD 54 nor the CNCI had been released in whole, and only a partially declassified 
version of the CNCI was released following a lawsuit that was filed by EPIC against the 
NSA for its mishandling of the FOIA request (Rotenberg, McCall, & Stepanovich, 2012).   
b. EINSTEIN III FOIA 
On March 11, 2012, EPIC requested from the Department of Homeland 
Security, the Privacy Impact Assessment for the pilot exercise of EINSTEIN III, as well 
as all contracts with private vendors, legal opinion, security analysis, and risk 
assessments concerning the program (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012). 
The Privacy Impact Assessment for the Initiative Three Exercise was published a week 
later on March 18, 2010 (Department of Homeland Security, 2010). 
c. Lieutenant General Alexander Testimony FOIA 
On April 16, 2010, EPIC requested from the NSA the classified 
supplement of Lieutenant General Keith Alexander’s testimony before the Senate Armed 
Service Committee. The testimony contained his answers to questions posed by the 
Committee pursuant to his nomination to the position of NSA Director, Chief of the 
Central Security Service and Commander of the United States Cyber Command 
(CYBERCOM). General Alexander’s public testimony raised concerns about the growing 
influence of the military in civilian cybersecurity efforts. Much of his remarks regarding 
the deployment of methods for monitoring electronic communications were classified, 
and the NSA has refused to make this information available. (Rotenberg, McCall, & 
Stepanovich, 2012) 
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d. EPIC–Google FOIA 
On February 4, 2010 EPIC submitted a FOIA request to the NSA 
following media coverage of a possible partnership between the NSA and Google 
brought about because of an alleged cyber-attack by Chinese hackers. The FOIA request 
sought: (EPIC vs. NSA, 2011)  
All records concerning an agreement or similar basis for collaboration, 
between the NSA and Google regarding cyber security, all records of 
communication between the NSA and Google concerning Gmail, and all 
records of communications regarding the NSA’s role in Google’s decision 
regarding the failure to routinely deploy encryption for cloud-based 
computing service, such as Google Docs. 
 
NSA responded to EPIC’s request on March 10, 2010 by invoking 
Exemption Three of the FOIA and Section Six of the National Security Agency Act to 
issue a Glomar response, in which the agency neither confirmed nor denied the existence 
of any responsive records. An agency may issue a Glomar response when to answer the 
FOIA inquiry would cause harm cognizable under an applicable statutory exemption. 
The agency must demonstrate that acknowledging the mere existence of responsive 
records would disclose exempt information (EPIC vs. NSA, 2011). 
EPIC filed suit in the district court challenging NSA’s Glomar response 
and in support of its motion for summary judgment, the NSA filed a declaration by Diane 
M. Janosek, NSA Deputy Associate Director for Policy and Records (the Janosek 
Declaration). The district court on July 8, 2011, held that NSA was entitled to summary 
judgment because the Janosek Declaration was both logical and plausible and 
contain[ed] sufficient detail, pursuant to Section 6, to support NSA’s claim that the 
protected information [sought by EPIC] pertains to NSA’s organization, functions, or 
activities  (EPIC vs. NSA, 2011). The Declaration further explained that if NSA disclosed 
whether records of cooperation or communications between Google and NSA existed, the 
disclosure of that information alone might reveal whether NSA investigated the threat, 
believed that the threat was a concern to the security of U.S. Government information 
systems, or took any measures in response (EPIC vs. NSA, 2011). 
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On May 11, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s 
opinion (EPIC vs. NSA, 2012). Given this precedent, it is likely that future FOIA 
requests surrounding EINSTEIN and related cybersecurity programs may be denied 
under the Glomar rule. 
3. Cybersecurity Legislative Proposals  
Pending cybersecurity legislation, The SECURE IT Act of 2012, and the 
Cybersecurity Act of 2012 both seek to amend the Federal Information Security 
Management Act (FISMA) by adding an exemption for information shared with or 
provided to a cybersecurity center (Rotenberg, McCall, & Stepanovich, 2012). EPIC, and 
several other civil liberty organizations, believe that provisions allowing different federal 
agencies to share information with DHS raise privacy challenges that need to be 
addressed. It is their belief that the FISMA reform authorizes federal agencies to share 
sensitive personally identifiable information with the Department of Homeland Security, 
authorizes DHS to disclose that information for law enforcement purposes, and that they 
may be intended to facilitate operation of EINSTEIN (Center for Democracy & 
Technology, 2012a). 
a. The SECURE IT Act of 2012 
On March 1, 2012 Several Senators, led by Senator John McCain, 
introduced the, Strengthening and Enhancing Cybersecurity by Using Research, 
Education, Information, and Technology Act (SECURE IT). The proposed legislation 
intends to protect and secure the nation against cybersecurity attacks by promoting 
collaboration and information-sharing, updating criminal laws to account for the growing 
cyber threat and enhance research programs to protect critical networks (U.S. Senate 
Commitee on Energy & Natural Resources, 2012).   
EPIC is concerned that some of the SECURE IT Act’s proposed 
provisions damage the Freedom of Information Act; that its additional exemption for 
information shared with or provided to cybersecurity centers, as well as the proposed 
exemption three provisions, that would specifically exempt from disclosure all cyber 
threat information shared with the government, are ill conceived because cyber threat 
 36 
information is defined broadly, and could include a large amount of information 
unrelated to cybersecurity (Rotenberg, McCall, & Stepanovich, 2012). Additionally EPIC 
believes that because the new provisions would be mandatory, agencies would be 
prohibited from disclosing information that they intended to make public or routinely 
available. In this way, EPIC believes the amendment could deny the public information 
that could assist in countering cyber threats, which might result in diminished public 
safety and national defense (Rotenberg, McCall, & Stepanovich, 2012).  
EPIC says that the Act’s provision governing disclosure of information to 
law enforcement which state that a, cybersecurity exchange that is a Federal entity may 
disclose cybersecurity threat indicator (if) the information appears to relate to a crime that 
has been, is being, or is about to be committed would, essentially, allow the government 
to flag any activity which may indicate a potential crime, including activities that are not 
part of a network intrusion. This practice could potentially violate search and seizure 
rights protected by the 4th amendment (Mills, 2012). EPIC believes that the Act fails to 
provide meaningful transparency and accountability protections, and that the handover of 
U.S. cybersecurity operations to the National Security Agency coupled with new 
exemptions from the Freedom of Information Act drastically limits public oversight 
necessary to prevent abuse and protect public privacy (Jackson, 2012).  
b. The Cybersecurity Act of 2012 
On February 15, 2012, Several Senators, led by Senator Joseph 
Lieberman, introduced the Cybersecurity Act of 2012. The Act is meant to enhance the 
security and resiliency of the cyber and communications infrastructure of the United 
States, and to provide the government with a clear structure for dealing with 
cybersecurity, including the security of critical infrastructure owned by the private sector 
(Cybersecurity Act, 2012) (U.S. Senate Commitee on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, 2012). 
Similar to their concerns with SECURE IT, EPIC finds fault with the 
Cybersecurity Act of 2012’s proposed Exemption Three provisions to exempt from 
disclosure any cybersecurity threat indicator disclosed by a non-federal entity to a 
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cybersecurity exchange. EPIC has found that the Act’s definition of cybersecurity threat 
indication is mostly the same as the cyber threat information described in the SECURE 
IT Act of 2012. Here too, EPIC advocates the definition of cybersecurity threat indicator 
be subjected to public scrutiny and oversight in order to prevent abuse of discretion 
(Rotenberg, McCall, & Stepanovich, 2012).  
C. CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY (CDT) 
1. Background 
The Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) is a nonprofit public policy 
organization and the leading Internet freedom organization. CDT’s mission is to 
conceptualize and implement public policies that will keep the Internet open, innovative, 
and free, by preserving the unique nature of the Internet, enhancing freedom of 
expression, protecting privacy, and limiting government surveillance. CDT has advocated 
for groundbreaking legislation, won landmark court cases, promoted industry standards 
and practices, successfully argued before the Supreme Court for protecting free speech 
online, and strengthened privacy protection (Center for Democracy & Technology, 
2012).  
2. EINSTEIN IDS 
Regarding EINSTEIN, other related cybersecurity programs, and pending 
legislation in support of these initiatives, CDT strongly disagrees with proposals to allow 
intra and inter-government information sharing by expanding government power to seize 
privately held data (Nojeim, 2009).   CDT does not believe that a governmental entity 
should be involved in monitoring private communications networks as part of a 
cybersecurity initiative, but that it should be the job of the private sector communications 
service providers themselves (Nojeim, 2009). CDT also advocates an incremental 
approach to information sharing, with the understanding that routine monitoring of and 
sharing with law enforcement and intelligence agencies, communications from civilians 
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to the government will chill the exercise of the First Amendment rights of free speech 
and petitioning the government (Nojeim, 2009).     
CDT criticizes the lack of transparency surrounding the EINSTEIN program and 
believes that it undermines the public trust that is essential to the success of its effort 
(Nojeim, 2009). Specifically, CDT questions whether EINSTEIN III’s IP addresses 
screening method can reliably focus on only those communications that are intended for 
the government while excluding private-to-private communications (Nojeim, 2010).      
3. Cybersecurity Legislative Proposals–Overview  
CDT believes that the proposed cybersecurity legislation; The Cybersecurity Act 
of 2012 and the SECURE IT Act of 2012 would trump existing privacy laws and that 
they would permit more private information to be shared than is necessary. That these 
laws would allow information to be shared with law enforcement without the need for a 
warrant, and provide for inadequate accountability measures to ensure that the 
information sharing rules are followed. CDT is particularly opposed to the information 
sharing provisions of both bills that allow information to flow to the NSA (Center for 
Democracy & Technology, 2012a). 
a. The SECURE IT Act of 2012 
CDT is critical of the information sharing language in the SECURE IT Act 
that expressly allows sharing with the NSA, and allows ISPs to monitor for, and share 
with the NSA, any, information that would foster situational awareness of the United 
States security posture (Center for Democracy & Technology, 2012a). Additionally, CDT 
finds fault with the SECURE IT Act’s provisions which allow information that is initially 
disclosed for cybersecurity purposes to be used for law enforcement purposes as well as 
for national security purposes unrelated to cybersecurity (Center for Democracy & 
Technology, 2012a). CDT believes that this could disrupt existing cybersecurity 
initiatives in the private sector, and that it could be used by government agencies to push 
industry in a direction that would not be desirable from a civil liberties standpoint (Center 
for Democracy & Technology, 2012a). 
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b. The Cybersecurity Act of 2012 
Similar to its stance on the SECURE IT Act’s information sharing 
provisions, the CDT finds fault with the Cybersecurity Act allowing information initially 
disclosed for cybersecurity purposes to be used for other law enforcement purposes. 
Specifically, CDT believes that language in the bill which states, information that 
appears to relate to a crime can be disclosed to law enforcement creates a backdoor 
warrantless wiretap (Center for Democracy & Technology, 2012a). 
CDT is critical of the Act’s broad classifications of information systems as 
being considered critical infrastructure information systems, and warns that a policy that 
treats all critical infrastructure information systems the same threatens elements of the 
Internet and communications structure critical to new economic models, human 
development, free speech and privacy; potentially stifling innovation, chilling free speech 
and violating privacy rights. (Nojeim, 2009)  
CDT is also critical of the Act’s FISMA reform provisions which 
authorizes federal agencies to share sensitive personally identifiable information (PII) 
with the Department of Homeland Security and also authorizes DHS to disclose that 
information for law enforcement purposes. CDT believes that these provisions are 
specifically intended to facilitate the operation of EINSTEIN technology (Center for 
Democracy & Technology, 2012a). 
D. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (ACLU) 
Despite its long history with advocating privacy rights, the ACLU has little to say 
regarding the EINTEIN program. The ACLU Northern California Division, on its 
website simply states about EINSTEIN that: (American Civil Liberties Union, 2012) 
Having privacy impact assessments and policies are necessary but not 
sufficient to protect privacy.  Nor are promises to not retain the data after 
the traffic analysis – there needs to be regular, consistent oversight and 
monitoring of the program – the kind of oversight that did not occur to 
prevent the abuse of National Security Letters by the FBI . Cyber-security 
is a very critical issue, but developing more ways to snoop on the online 
activities of innocent Americans, with no showing of suspicious or 
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harmful activity is not the way to deal with it. As the Congressional 
leaders understood, this program should not go forward.  
Similarly, the ACLU opposes a proposed amendment to the pending Cyber 
Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA) that would permit surveillance systems 
that are even broader and stronger than EINSTEIN. The ACLU believes that the 
proposed amendment is broad enough to include government contractors and university 
networks, and authorizes Homeland Security to intercept a large portion of Web and 
email communications and deploy countermeasures against Internet-based adversaries 
(McCullagh, 2012). Opposition from the ACLU stems from the section of CISPA that 
says notwithstanding any other provision of law, companies may share information with 
the government. The ACLU believes that the word notwithstanding, seems to make the 
legislation trump all existing federal and state civil and criminal laws, and that that makes 
it a clear threat to First Amendment freedom of speech rights as well as Fourth 
Amendment privacy rights (McCullagh, 2012).  
E. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH GROUP (CRS) 
Civil rights organizations are not alone with their concerns about EINSTEIN. 
Many members of Congress have also been critical of the program. On April 2012, the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) published a report for members and committees 
of Congress outlining those concerns. Specifically the research group found that 
EINSTEIN’s monitoring of all communications coming to and from federal agency 
computers posed significant privacy implications, and would most likely violate Fourth 
Amendment guarantees of being free from unreasonable searches and excessive 
government intrusion (U.S. Library of Congress, 2012). CRS acknowledged DHS’s 
development of procedures to address privacy concerns; including the minimization of 
information collection, training, accountability requirements, and retention rules, but does 
not believe that they go far enough to preserve privacy interests protected under the 
Fourth Amendment. (U.S. Library of Congress, 2012) 
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1. The Expectation of Privacy  
CRS does believe that, in some instances, monitoring of networks might not 
violate Fourth Amendment protections, and that for those protections to apply, a court 
must first inquire whether the monitoring constitutes a search or seizure in the 
constitutional sense (U.S. Library of Congress, 2012). This means that if a search has 
occurred, a court will have to determine first, whether the individual had an actual 
expectation of privacy that society would deem reasonable; and if so, the court could then 
ask if the search was reasonable. Typically a search would not be reasonable unless the 
government obtains a warrant based upon probable cause, but there are, exceptions to this 
rule such as special needs and consent (U.S. Library of Congress, 2012). 
The CRS report cites the legal case United States v. Warshak as an example 
where a court upheld the principle of an individual having a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the content of communications. In this case, the report says the Ninth Circuit 
ruled that a subscriber enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of 
emails that are stored with, or sent or received through, a commercial Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) (U.S. Library of Congress, 2012). Based on this the CRS believes that 
because EINSTEIN III not only collects the routing, non-content portions of 
communications, such as email header information, but also scans and collects the 
content of the communications, such as the body of emails, that individuals most likely 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those electronic communications. The CRS 
Report further outlines that the EINSTEIN program requires a Fourth Amendment 
inquiry into two discrete classes of individuals: (1) federal agency employees who access 
federal networks while at work; and (2) private persons who either contact a federal 
agency directly or who communicate via the Internet with a federal employee. CRS 
believes that the Fourth Amendment rights of the former primarily rest on cases dealing 
with privacy in the workplace and consent, while the latter requires a broader look at 
privacy and electronic communications (U.S. Library of Congress, 2012). 
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2. Federal Employees 
Regarding the monitoring of federal agency employees, CRS says that answers to 
questions about the use of log-on banners, computer user agreements, and the scope of 
non-investigatory, work-related monitoring, are unclear. They cite the case City of 
Ontario v. Quon, where the Supreme Court upheld, under the Fourth Amendment, the 
city’s search of text messages sent on a city-issued pager by a police officer employed by 
that city. The Court assumed that the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in sent text messages, and that the review of those text messages constituted a search. The 
Court’s decision meant that the same rules that applied to a search of an employee’s 
office also apply equally to an intrusion into his electronic communications. However, 
the Court then applied the special needs exception to the warrant requirement, which 
holds that a government employer need not get a warrant to conduct a search when the 
search is done for a non-investigatory, work-related purpose (U.S. Library of Congress, 
2012). 
Like the policy of the City of Ontario, a condition of enrolling in EINSTEIN 
requires participant federal agencies to certify that certain log-on banners or computer 
user agreements are in place to ensure employees are aware of and consent to the 
monitoring, interception, and search of their communications on federal systems.  
Based on this, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel believes that the use 
of the log-on banners on all federal computers will eliminate any expectation of privacy 
in communications transmitted over those systems. CRS points out however, that, Quon 
was limited to searches for a non-investigatory work-related purpose, and that if 
EINSTEIN could be seen as overreaching this permissible purpose, by scanning emails 
for unlawful activity instead of malicious computer activity, a court may find its scope a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment (U.S. Library of Congress, 2012). 
3. Private Citizens  
CRS believes that privacy issues surrounding communications sent by a private 
person to a federal employee via governmental email or personal email account are more 
serious than those surrounding the communications of federal employees because the 
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private citizen has neither consented to monitoring by clicking on a log-on banner nor 
signed a user agreement. CRS recognizes that the third-party doctrine, which seeks to 
protect privacy by extending the prevention of unreasonable searches and seizures of a 
person’s records held by a third party, could arguably permit EINSTEIN’s monitoring of 
private citizens. However, CRS notes that court cases such as Smith v. Maryland and 
United States v. Warshak have significantly diminished protections provided by the third 
party doctrine, and that these third-party cases also traditionally applied only to non-
content information (U.S. Library of Congress, 2012). 
4. The Special Needs Exemption  
CRS’s stance is that, if the assumption is made that both federal employees and 
those communicating with them have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents 
of their communications, EINSTEIN has to then be tested under the general 
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment which requires that all government 
information gathering activities require that those searches be reasonable; meaning that 
they require a warrant supported by probable cause (Solove, 2010).  
Here, the CRS report points out arguments in favor of applying the special needs 
exception, where Courts have held that when there are special governmental needs, 
beyond normal law enforcement, the government may need neither a warrant nor any 
level of individualized suspicion. The CRS report gives as examples of such cases, the 
rules used to support sobriety roadblocks and border searches. The report suggests that an 
argument could be made that the impracticality of obtaining a warrant for a cyber-threat, 
and that since the purpose of the EINSTEIN program is beyond normal law enforcement, 
the application of the special needs doctrine to the EINSTEIN program may be justified 
(U.S. Library of Congress, 2012). 
F. SUMMARY 
Although the concerns of private individuals, civil rights organizations and the 
U.S. Congress are clear. Specific concerns about the EINSTEIN programs capabilities are 
not well defined. Most significant opposition to the program seems to be centered on  the 
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disclosure of exactly how the program operates, what information it has the potential to 
collect, to what extent the NSA will be involved, and how the potential capture of 
communications that have been mistakenly directed to systems under the protections of 
EINSTEIN might potentially be misused. Through FOIA requests EPIC seeks to gain 
insight into the unknown operations of EINSTEIN that might help to answer these 
questions, while CDT, the ACLU and CRS, focus on privacy implications based on what 
is known about EINSTEIN.   
To quell the concerns of these organizations, DHS’s Privacy Impact Assessments 
for the Initiative three Exercise (EINSTEIN) should reveal as much information regarding 
the technical operations of the program as security will allow, and where security will 
not, a classified version should be made available to Congressional Committees that have 
the requisite level of security clearance. This level of disclosure could satisfy EPIC’s 
desire for greater insight into the unknown operations of EINSTEIN, and also give 
greater clarity about the legal implications to the other concerned organizations. 
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IV. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. DHS PRIVACY POLICY FOR EINSTEIN 
1. EINSTEIN III Testing Exercise Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) 
The EINSTEIN III Testing Exercise Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), states that 
the exercise’s purpose is to,  
Demonstrate the ability of an existing Internet Service Provider, that is 
designated as a Trusted Internet Connection Access Provider (TICAP) to 
select and redirect Internet traffic from a single participating government 
agency through the Exercise technology, for U.S. CERT to apply intrusion 
detection and prevention measures to that traffic and for U.S. CERT to 
generate automated alerts about selected cyber threats. (U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, 2010) 
The report goes on to state that the PIA is being conducted because the Internet 
traffic being analyzed might contain Personally Identifiable Information (PII), and that 
locations for deploying the technology somewhere other than private telecommunications 
companies networks were considered and ruled out due to cost, scalability, network 
coverage and speed of implementation (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010). 
To conduct the exercise, participating government agencies would supply a list of 
IP addresses to the Trusted Internet Connection Access Providers (TICAP), which will 
designate what Internet traffic is destined for, or coming from participating agency 
systems (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2010). Once the TICAP has identified 
this, they will verify the traffic is in fact only the participating agency’s traffic, and 
redirect the traffic to a secured facility where the EINSTEIN technology will analyze it 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010). Additionally, the PIA states that only the 
limited portion of the redirected traffic that is associated with identified cyber threats will 
be available to U.S. CERT analysts for review, and that U.S. CERT will analyze this 
data, in accordance with written information handling procedures (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2010). Including procedures to, identify information that could be 
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considered PII, verify whether the information specifically links to an individual, and 
purge that information from the analysis unless it is necessary for further U.S. CERT 
analysis (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010). 
Written information handling procedures, as described in the EINSTEIN III 
Testing Exercise Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), state that U.S. CERT personnel must 
determine that PII, if collected, is required for later analysis before it is further processed 
or retained, and that information deemed unnecessary for further analysis is to be purged. 
If and when PII is used, U.S. CERT’s information handling procedures require that U.S. 
CERT personnel summarize and document why the information is necessary, including a 
description of the cyber threat, the information in question, and why further analysis of 
the information is necessary. Additionally, both the U.S. CERT Director and Deputy 
Director would be provided weekly summaries of all instances when PII was deemed 
necessary for further analysis, and that the process would be periodically reviewed by the 
Oversight and Compliance Offices of U.S. CERT and The Office of Cybersecurity and 
Communications (CS&C) (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010). 
The EINSTEIN III Testing Exercise Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) also 
addresses the possibility of non-governmentally provided IP Addresses being mistakenly 
monitored, resulting in the PII of Internet traffic not destined to, or originating from 
government computer networks being collected. The PIA states that in this event the PII, 
will be removed and U.S. CERT will analyze the situation and provide remedial actions 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010). False Positives, or misidentified 
malicious code and the subsequent alerting to Internet traffic and/or preventing 
transmission, are to be documented to include the nature of those false positives, 
including the specific information generated by the faulty signature (particularly if that 
data includes PII), and data of false positives is to be removed or modified to eliminate 
future false positive events (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010). 
The EINSTEIN III Testing Exercise Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) rests on 
legal analysis provided during the Preceding EINSTEIN II Exercise (Bradbury, 2012). 
The legal opinions, as explained in the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal 
Counsel’s reports: Legality of Intrusion-Detection System to Protect Unclassified 
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Computer Networks in the Executive Branch, and Legal Issues relating to the Testing, 
Use, and Deployment of an Intrusion-Detection System (EINSTEIN 2.0) to Protect 
Unclassified Computer Networks in the Executive Branch, both conclude that user 
consent is given to the monitoring of network traffic to and from government agency 
computer networks by implementing and enforcing the use of model log-on banners 
(Bradbury, 2012). The PIA states that:  
The decision to use the participating agency’s network or communicate 
electronically with the agency is essentially the decision to provide 
network flow records and the other network traffic that will be scanned 
with the Exercise technology. (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2010) 
Additionally the legal opinions state that government employees give consent to 
the search by agreeing to a computer-users agreement that notifies them of monitoring, 
and that any person sending information to a government employee is not privy to a 
reasonable right to privacy in regard to their communications, as they cannot object if the 
third party conveys that information or records thereof to law enforcement authorities   
(Bradbury, 2012). 
B. PRIOR STUDIES 
1. Striking the Right Balance, Tina M. Skahill 
In her thesis, Tina M. Skahill examines fusion center policy, and recommends 
policy options to simultaneously safeguard against abuse of citizens’ privacy while 
facilitating the collection, maintenance, and dissemination of information (Skahill, 2010). 
Principally, the analysis identified that fusion center’s collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of information derived from the various participating sources, have a 
profound impact upon the Fourth Amendment right to privacy, and that this activity is the 
most controversial privacy issues regarding fusion centers (Skahill, 2010). The thesis also 




to states’ privacy laws, and that this adherence encouraged policy shopping, meaning that 
agencies adhered to local policy, although it contradicted the policy of their agency, or 
vice versa (Skahill, 2010). 
Also identified in the thesis was that guidelines issued by federal agencies such as 
DHS and DOJ, failed to address the reconciliation of community-policing principles with 
fusion center operations, and that the failure of adequately addressing the competing 
principles of security and transparency resulted in inconsistencies among fusion centers 
(Skahill, 2010). The thesis also identified that the guidelines recommending self-
conducted privacy-impact assessments, fail to address the inherent problem with an 
agency conducting its own assessments (Skahill, 2010). 
2. Cybersecurity and Freedom on the Internet, Gregory T. Nojiem 
In this article the researchers’ acknowledge the importance of cybersecurity 
programs and policy and also acknowledge the need to monitor traffic to and from 
government networks. However, the researchers’ contend that protecting these systems 
cannot be accomplished if they threaten user privacy, or innovation. The researchers’ 
argue that cybersecurity programs can only be successful if they encourage private 
industry participation instead of mandating it. The researchers’ state that legal issues are 
covered, initially, by consent, and secondly by self-defense provisions of current laws that 
allow information sharing from private companies to government agencies. However, the 
article claims that privacy issues do not stop there, as the problem of inadvertent capture 
of private information is not addressed. Also that no measures are in place to prevent 
misuse of information by the private communications companies themselves and that the 
role of law enforcement and intelligence is not clear (Nojeim, 2010). Instead of requiring 
the participation of private companies, the researchers’ advocate giving incentives to 
private companies to encourage their sharing of threat information (Nojeim, 2010). 
In regard to the EINSTEIN Program, the article warns that if Einstein III were to 
analyze private-to-private communications, the interception would likely be considered 
an interception under the electronic surveillance laws, requiring a court order. To remedy 
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this, the article calls for an independent audit mechanism to ensure that such private-to-
private communications are not scrutinized (Nojeim, 2010).  
3. Privacy, Linda Koontz 
In her testimony before the Senate’s Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, Linda Koontz, argues that although privacy laws and guidance set 
minimum requirements for agencies, in regard to the collection of PII, they fail to do so 
consistently throughout the federal government and that they may not fully adhere to key 
privacy principles (Koontz, 2008). She raises concerns that, the framework of legal 
mechanisms for protecting personal privacy that has been developed over the years may 
no longer be sufficient, given current practices (Koontz, 2008). The GAO’s opinion, as 
testified by Mrs. Koontz, is that for the government to strike the correct balance between 
the need to collect and use information, while also preserving privacy rights, privacy 
protection application must be consistent across all federal activities, and limited use of 
personally identifiable information collected must be assured (Koontz, 2008). 
Federal agencies’ use of personal information is governed by the Privacy Act of 
1974 and the E-Government Act of 2002, and in her testimony Mrs. Koontz claims that 
the Privacy Act’s definition of system of records, which sets the scope of the acts 
protection, is too narrow in scope, and does not always apply to all information collected 
(Koontz, 2008). She explains that the Act’s definition of a record as, A group of records 
that is under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name 
of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular 
assigned to the individual allows for several ways in which personally identifiable 
information might be collected outside the Act’s definition, and therefore not be 
protected by it (5 U.S.C. 552a, 1974). She gives as example, data mining, where a system 
performs analysis by looking for patterns of personal information located in other 
systems of records or performs subject-based queries across multiple data sources that 




that to address these issues, the system-of-records definition be revised to cover all 
personally identifiable information collected, used, and maintained systematically by the 
federal government (Koontz, 2008).  
In discussing the issue of ensuring the limited use of personally identifiable 
information collected, Mrs. Koontz states that there are insufficient specificity 
requirements of purpose descriptions in public notices, and that inconsistency in the 
definition of routine uses across federal agencies weakens use limitations. She argues that 
the Privacy Act’s limitations on the usage of PII within an agency are overly modest; that 
the Privacy Act may not apply to data shared between agencies, and that broad 
specification of purpose could lead to unreasonable ranges of use, calling into question 
the legitimacy of meaningful limitations (Koontz, 2008). She argues that the current 
practice of agencies limiting information internally, only to those with a need to know, 
does not take necessary steps to limit the use of this information (Koontz, 2008). Mrs. 
Koontz also states that while the Privacy Act provides protections for information that is 
in systems-of records, it does not protect data after they have been disclosed to other 
agencies, and that data shared outside could fall subject to misuse. To correct these 
deficiencies Mrs. Koontz suggest that laws or guidance be revised to require agencies to 
justify the use of key elements of personal information, set specific limits on routine uses 
and internal agency use of personal information, and that they also require agencies to 
establish formal agreements with external entities before sharing personal information 
with them (Koontz, 2008). 
4. Square Legal Pegs in Round Cyber Holes, John N. Greer 
This article argued that current laws governing intelligence agencies, such as the 
NSA, were established in a pre-cyberspace world, and that the NSA’s dual roles of being 
an intelligence collection agency operating outside the United States, and a defender of 
national information systems domestically, thwarts the agencies efforts to maintain the 
trust of the American people (Greer, 2010). The researcher argued that the digital age and 
evolution of the cyberspace environment make it inappropriate to think of threats in terms 
of geographical boundaries, explores the need to interpret existing legal authority in the 
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new cyberspace world, and how to achieve the balance between securing the nations 
networks and protecting the privacy of U.S citizens (Greer, 2010). 
The article calls for the creation of a central organization to gather information 
from multiple sources including federal, state, local, foreign and private sources, to 
generate a common operating picture of global network status. The article recognized that 
this arrangement would create a myriad of legal complications, and suggested tagging 
data elements collected with information such as authorities and restrictions, and that data 
collected by the center be limited to those with proper authority. The article also 
suggested that it might be necessary to draft regulations making the sharing of data 
mandatory for owners of critical infrastructure (Greer, 2010). The article called for an 
amendment of the minimization procedures governing the sharing of Signals Intelligence 
(SIGINT) information, as currently the Supreme Court has ruled that the interception of 
electronic communications falls under the purview of the Fourth Amendment; meaning 
the NSA can provide SIGINT to customer agencies within the federal government only 
after it is has been evaluated and reviewed for minimization procedures, a process that 
makes the sharing of threat information in real-time impossible (Greer, 2010). 
The article supports NSA cybersecurity activities that are subject to oversight 
both internally and externally. Internally, the article listed: component oversight and 
compliance officers, component-level training, and reviews by the Offices of General 
Counsel and Inspector General, and an Agency Privacy and Civil Liberties officers. 
Externally it listed: review by the Department of Justice, the Intelligence Oversight 
Board, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Civil Liberties Protection 
Officer, and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, the Armed Services, 
Intelligence, Judiciary, and Government Reform Committees of Congress, and the 
Judicial Branch, by reviewing applications to the FISC (Greer, 2010).  
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C. GAPS IN THE POLICY 
1. Lack of Review of PII Weekly Summary by Outside Agency 
The EINSTEIN III Testing Exercise Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) stated that 
there is a requirement that U.S. CERT personnel determine if collected PII is required for 
later analysis before it is further processed or retained, and that information deemed 
unnecessary for further analysis be purged. The PIA also stated that when PII is used, 
information handling procedures require that U.S. CERT personnel summarize and 
document why the information is necessary, and that, both the U.S. CERT Director and 
Deputy Director be provided weekly summaries of all instances when PII was deemed 
necessary for further analysis; a process that is subject to periodic review by the 
Oversight and Compliance Offices of U.S. CERT and The Office of Cybersecurity and 
Communications (CS&C) (Department of Homeland Security, 2010). Not covered by the 
PIA is that no one outside the DHS has oversight into the procedure, and that without 
outside oversight a conflict of interest may allow the misuse of PII to go unchecked.  
2. No Description of Remedial Action 
The EINSTEIN III Exercise PIA addresses the possibility of non-governmentally 
provided IP addresses being mistakenly monitored, and Internet traffic not destined to, or 
originating from government computer networks being collected. In the event of this 
happening the PIA states that the traffic will be removed and U.S. CERT will analyze the 
situation and provide remedial actions. However, the PIA gives no further description of 
the remedial action that will be taken, nor does it describe any procedure to notify the 
originators of the misdirected traffic of inadvertent capture of their traffic without their 
consent. Further, the PIA does not provide redress instructions for the originators of the 
misdirected traffic.   
3. Legal Opinions Based on EINSTEIN II Capabilities  
The U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel’s opinions, Legality of 
Intrusion-Detection System to Protect Unclassified Computer Networks in the Executive 
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Branch, and Legal Issues relating to the Testing, Use, and Deployment of an Intrusion-
Detection System (EINSTEIN 2.0) to Protect Unclassified Computer Networks in the 
Executive Branch, stands as the legal justification for conducting the EINSTEIN III 
Exercise (Bradbury, 2012). The opinion states that users consent to monitoring by 
clicking through model log-on banners (Bradbury, 2012). Additionally, the legal opinions 
state that government employees give consent to the search by agreeing to a computer-
users agreement that notifies them of monitoring, and that any person sending 
information to a government employee is not privy to a reasonable right to privacy in 
regard to their communications, as they cannot object if the third party conveys that 
information or records thereof to law enforcement authorities (Bradbury, 2012).  
However, these legal opinions were based on the capabilities of EINSTEIN II, 
which was deployed on the networks of participant government agencies only. 
EINSTEIN III monitors traffic on live networks of private telecommunication providers 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2010). The legal opinions do not take into account 
the issue of consent not being obtained by all of the customers of the participant private 
telecommunication providers. If PII is obtained through Internet traffic that was 
mistakenly monitored, the absence of consent by the private telecommunication 
provider’s customer would, according to the legal opinions used in the EINSTEIN III 
PIA, be considered an illegal search based on the requirements of the Wiretap Act, FISA, 
SCA and the Pen/Trap Act (Bradbury, 2012). 
 D. GAPS IN THE LITERATURE 
1. Fourth Amendment Rights Not Addressed 
The thesis, Striking the Right Balance: Fusion Centers and Privacy (Skahill, 
2010) provided valuable insight into the issue of Security vs. Privacy, particularly with 
regard to government policy, and policy documents. However, the thesis focused 
primarily on the practice of information sharing between federal and local government 
entities, and did not provide analysis of collecting or monitor PII in cyberspace. 
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Particularly the Fourth Amendment right to protection from warrantless search and 
seizure, and how it should be applied to searches in cyberspace are not addressed. 
2. Literature Fails to Address the Lack of Remediation Procedures  
The article Cybersecurity and Freedom on the Internet (Nojiem, 2010), states that 
the legal issues of monitoring Internet traffic are covered, initially, by consent, and 
secondly by self-defense provisions of current laws that allow information sharing from 
private companies to government agencies  (Nojeim, 2010). The author did however, 
address the fact that inadvertent capture of private information was not addressed, and 
that no measures were in place to prevent misuse of information by the private 
communications companies (Nojeim, 2010). In regard to the EINSTEIN Program, the 
author said that if Einstein III were to analyze private-to-private communications, the 
interception would likely be considered an interception under the electronic surveillance 
laws, requiring a court order. To remedy this, the article called for an independent audit 
mechanism to ensure that such private-to-private communications are not scrutinized 
(Nojeim, 2010). The article however, does not address the lack of remediation procedures 
for the inadvertent capture of private information.   
The article, Privacy; Congress Should Consider Alternatives for Strengthening 
Protection of Personally Identifiable Information (Koontz, 2008), approaches the issue of 
monitoring Internet traffic by addressing the scope of the Privacy Act’s definition of 
system of records. Here the researcher argues that the Act’s narrow definition allows for 
several ways in which personally identifiable information might be collected outside the 
Act’s definition, skirting the protection it provides. The researcher suggests that to 
address this issue, the system-of-records definition be revised to cover all personally 
identifiable information collected, used, and maintained systematically by the federal 
government (Koontz, 2008). 
The EINTEIN III Exercise PIA states however, that those sending Internet traffic 
to or from federal systems are not privy to a right to privacy because they have given 
consent. That being the case, revising of the Privacy Act’s definition of Systems of 
Record, as suggested, would cover EINSTEIN III as it does collect PII. However, it 
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would not apply any greater protection to the PII because the PIA holds that consent was 
given. Revising the definition of a System of record does not go far enough to protect PII 
in the case of EINSTEIN, especially in the cases where PII is collected mistakenly.  
3. Literature Ignores EINSTEIN III Legal Opinions Failure to Address 
the Lack of Consent  
The article, Cybersecurity and Freedom on the Internet, (Nojeim, 2010) argues 
that cybersecurity policy and practices should avoid mandatory participation from private 
industry, because no measures are in place to prevent misuse of information. Instead of 
requiring the participation of private companies, the article proposes offering incentives 
to the private companies to encourage their sharing of threat information (Nojeim, 2010).  
The article, Square Legal Pegs in Round Cyber Holes, (Greer, 2010) states an 
opposing view on the participation or private communications companies. Here the 
researcher suggests that it might be necessary to draft regulations making the sharing of 
data mandatory for owners of critical infrastructure (Greer, 2010).  
Both articles failed to acknowledge the lack of consent from private 
communications companies’ customers. The issues of voluntary or mandated private 
company participation can only be addressed after the issue of illegal monitoring of 
innocent communications without the consent is addressed.  
E. SUMMARY 
Before analyzing literature on the broader subject of privacy and technology, it 
was necessary to review the policy documents central to the research are of this thesis. 
Through careful examination of the EINSTEIN III Testing Exercise Privacy Impact 
Assessment (PIA), several questions have been raised, and gaps in privacy protections 
discovered. By reviewing the document, the purpose of this research is better understood, 
and research questions validated.  
Next a survey of literature about the broader subject provided an overview of 
significant writings within the research area. The article Cybersecurity and Freedom on 
the Internet (Nojeim, 2010) provides the most significant contribution to privacy and 
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technology understanding, as it is the one that most directly confronts privacy concerns 
surrounding, specifically, Cyberspace and the Internet. It directly addressed legal issues, 
and the participation of private ISP’s in programs such as EINSEIN, and even offered 
solutions to protect privacy while also securing government networks.  
The article Privacy; Congress Should Consider Alternatives for Strengthening 
Protection of Personally Identifiable Information (Koontz,2008) provided a greater 
understanding of privacy laws and guidance in regard to the collection of PII, and the 
article Square Legal Pegs in Round Cyber Holes (Greer, 2010) provided insight into 
possible new governance structures and/or reforming of the defined boundaries of 
cyberspace. Least pertinent to our understanding of privacy and technology was the thesis 
Striking the Right Balance (Skahill, 2010). Although the writing provided a framework 
for understanding changing policy as a means of protecting privacy rights, it was not 
relevant enough to this thesis’s topic of research, as it deals with fusion centers collecting 








V. RECOMMENDED POLICY 
A. A NEW EINSTEIN III PIA 
1. Independent Review 
In the event that collected PII is required for future analysis of a Cyber threat, the 
EINSTEIN III Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) states that before that information is 
retained, information handling procedures have to be conducted to summarize and 
document why the information is necessary, and that, both the U.S. CERT Director and 
Deputy Director be provided weekly summaries of all instances when this is done. 
Further, the process is subject to periodic review by the Oversight and Compliance 
Offices of U.S. CERT and CS&C (Department of Homeland Security, 2010).  
The fact that the periodic review is conducted within the Department of 
Homeland Security creates a conflict of interest. Policy regarding privacy compliance 
should be under the oversight of individuals that are impartial and unbiased. A group or 
committee with no involvement or allegiances to the DHS should conduct the periodic 
review to be described in a new EINSTEIN III PIA. This thesis recommends that the 
EINSTEIN III initiative PIA be re-written to include the creation of an independent 
committee to conduct, or be a party to, the weekly summaries and the periodic review 
process. In this way, the improper handling of PII will be less likely and conflicts of 
interest that may allow the misuse of PII to go unchecked will be reduced.  
2. Remedial Actions 
In the event that the EINSTEIN III IDS mistakenly monitors traffic that is not 
destined to, or originating from government computer networks, the current PIA states 
that the traffic will be removed and that U.S. CERT will analyze the situation and provide 
remedial actions. However, the PIA gives no further description of the remedial action 
that will be taken, nor does it describe any procedure to notify the originators of the 
misdirected traffic about the incident. Furthermore, the PIA does not provide redress 
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instructions for the originators of the misdirected traffic (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2010).  
This thesis recommends that the EINSTEIN III initiative PIA be re-written to 
include a complete description of remedial actions that will be taken in the event of 
EINTEIN III mistakenly monitors traffic that is not destined to, or originating from 
government computer networks. Remedial action procedures to notify the originators of 
the misdirected traffic, and redress instruction might be based, in-part, on the Department 
of the Navy’s (DON) PII breach reporting procedures.  
The policy for the DON states that all commands must have designated a person 
in writing who is responsible for submitting DON breach reports using OPNAV 5211/13: 
DON Loss or Compromise of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) Breach Reporting 
Form and OPNAV 5211/14: DON Loss or Compromise of Personally Identifiable 
Information (PII) After Action Reporting Form. The procedure states that within one hour 
of discovery of a loss or suspected loss of PII, the designated privacy official must notify 
proper authorities using OPNAV form 5211/13, and that the initial report include a brief 
description of the incident, including circumstances of the breach, type of information 
lost or compromised, whether the PII was encrypted, and whether the recipients had a 
need to know (Schmith, 2011). 
Within 24 hours of receipt, the DON CIO reviews the initial report and 
determines the potential risk of harm to affected personnel. Within 10 days, if required, 
the designated privacy official must mail notification letters to affected personnel, and 
within 30 days of the breach, the designated privacy official, using OPNAV form 
5211/14, must send notice to the appropriate authorities of remedial actions taken to 
prevent recurrence, notification status, lessons learned and disciplinary action taken, 
where appropriate (Schmith, 2011). 
3. Redactions 
On March 11, 2012, EPIC requested from the Department of Homeland Security, 
the Privacy Impact Assessment for the pilot exercise of EINSTEIN III, as well as all 
contracts with private vendors, legal opinion, security analysis, and risk assessments 
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concerning the program (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012). The Privacy 
Impact Assessment for the Initiative Three Exercise was published a week later on March 
18, 2010 (Department of Homeland Security, 2010). 
To date, the Department of Homeland Security has not released the full, classified 
PIA for the EINTEIN III in either complete or redacted form, but instead drafted a 
different version for release to the public. This thesis recommends that the new 
EINSTEIN III PIA be a full classified PIA and be released in a redacted form where 
necessary. Although it is likely that EPIC will appeal the redactions, and seek even more 
disclosure, the publication of a redacted PIA would be a good first step in assuring those 
concerned that PII is not being improper handled.  
B. A NEW EINSTEIN III LEGAL COUNSEL OPINION  
The PIA for the EINSTEIN III Exercise justifies its legality with analysis 
provided during the preceding EINSTEIN II Exercise (Bradbury, 2012). The U.S. 
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel’s opinion titled, Legality of Intrusion-
Detection System to Protect Unclassified Computer Networks in the Executive Branch, 
and Legal Issues relating to the Testing, Use, and Deployment of an Intrusion-Detection 
System (EINSTEIN 2.0) to Protect Unclassified Computer Networks in the Executive 
Branch. The opinion concluded that user consent is given to the monitoring of network 
traffic to and from government agency computer networks, by implementing and 
enforcing the use of model log-on banners (Bradbury, 2012). Additionally the legal 
opinion states that government employees give consent to the search by agreeing to a 
computer-users agreement that notifies them of monitoring, and that any person sending 
information to a government employee is not privy to a reasonable right to privacy in 
regard to their communications, as they, cannot object if the third party conveys that 
information or records thereof to law enforcement authorities (Bradbury, 2012).  
However, the legal opinion was based on the capabilities of EINSTEIN II, which 
was deployed only on the networks of participant government agencies, and monitored 
recorded Internet traffic. EINSTEIN III, monitors traffic on live networks in real-time 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2010). This ability, coupled with its proposed 
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deployment on the network of private telecommunication providers, and the possibility of 
innocent Internet traffic being mistakenly monitored, makes re-using the legal bases for 
EINSTEIN II inappropriate as it does not address the issue of consent not being obtained 
by all of the customers of the participant private telecommunication providers. If PII is 
obtained through Internet traffic that was mistakenly monitored or prevented, the absence 
of consent by the private telecommunication provider’s customer would, according to the 
EINSTEIN III PIA, be considered an illegal search based on the requirements of the 
Wiretap Act, FISA, and the Pen/Trap Act (Bradbury, 2012). 
This thesis recommends DOJ reexamine the legal issues in the context of the new 
capabilities and deployment intentions of the EINSTEIN III Exercise, and that DHS 
include updated legal opinions in a rewritten EINSTEIN III Legal Counsel’s opinions. In 
the drafting of a new EINSTEIN III DHS legal counsel should address directly the 






 amendment rights. Additionally, drafters of new 
legal opinion should make use of one or all of the following exemptions provided for in 
current communications legislation. 
1. Federal Communications Act Exemption 
Drafters of a new EINSTEIN III legal opinion should be able to justify the 
monitoring of ISP Internet traffic by invoking provisions of Section 605 of the Federal 
Communications Act. The Act provides for Fourth Amendment protections as it states, 
No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and 
divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such 
intercepted communications to any person (47 U.S.C. 151, 1934). Section 605 does not 
restrict officials from engaging in wiretapping, it only prevents them from disclosing 
intercepted communications in court proceedings (Solove, 2006). In this way, drafters of 
a new EINSTEIN III legal opinion can justify the technologies legality by stating that no 
part of captured data, to include PII, would be allowed as evidence in court. 
Additionally, drafters of a new EINSTEIN III legal opinion could incorporate 
Section 606 of the Federal Communications Act. Section 606 provides for suspension or 
amendment of the rules and regulations governing intercepted communications by the 
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President. Section 606 states that if the President proclaims that there exists a war, threat 
of war, state of public peril, disaster or national emergency, he may, in the interests of 
national security, authorize government use or control of communications facilities, and 
suspend or amend rules and regulations applicable to any or all stations or devices 
capable of emitting electromagnetic radiations (47 U.S.C. 151, 1934). Drafters of a new 
EINSTEIN III legal opinion should seek a pronouncement from the President that states 
that there indeed exists a threat of war as a result of attacks in Cyberspace, and that the 
use of the exemptions afforded in Section 606 of the Federal Communications Act can be 
applied to EINSTEIN III’s monitoring of ISP networks.  
However, it should be noted that even if the drafters of a new EINSTEIN III legal 
opinion where to incorporate these exemptions they would still be left with a problem. 
Although Section 605 and Section 606 offer protections to the right of due process, and a 
legal foundation for EINSTEIN III’s monitoring of ISP network traffic, they do not 
prevent the solitude or privacy of those being monitored from being invaded; in other 
words it would not prevent intrusion upon seclusion.  
Additionally it is likely that a presidential invocation of Section 606 exemptions 
would bring about heavy opposition from privacy advocates, and American citizens, who 
might view the application of such exemptions abusive, and overreaching in the absence 
of a more tangible threat to national security.   
2. Title III of the Omnibus Exemption  
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act prohibits the 
unauthorized, nonconsensual interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications by 
government agencies as well as private parties. However, the Act does provide some 
exceptions that could be used by the drafters of a new EINSTEIN III legal opinion. 
The first exemption states that service providers may circumvent the Act’s 
prohibitions on nonconsensual interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications, 
for uses in the normal course of (their) employment while engaged in any activity which 
is a necessary incident to the rendition of (their) service. Drafters of a new EINSTEIN III 
legal opinion could use this exemption to establish the legality of participant IPS’s. 
 62 
Participant ISPs could declare that the monitoring of their networks by ENSTEIN III is 
necessary to the rendition of their services, as they have agreed to play a role in securing 
government networks. Those ISP customers who do not agree to the monitoring would be 
free to reject the participant ISP’s services and therefore be free from such monitoring.    
An additional exemption to the Act states that there is an exception to the 
requirement that government officials obtain a warrant before intercepting covered 
communications where a specially designated investigative or law enforcement officer, 
reasonably determines that an emergency situation exists that involves: immediate 
danger of death or serious physical injury to any person, conspiratorial activities 
threatening the national security interest, or conspiratorial activities characteristic of 
organized crime (47 U.S.C. 151, 1934). Research suggests that the drafters of a new 
EINSTEIN III legal opinion could use this exemption to justify the legality of the 
technology’s use. The drafters should explain in detail that the exemption applies in 
instances of Cybersecurity attacks on government networks as they significantly threaten 
national security by having the possible effect of disruption of service and corruption of 
command and control of U.S. Armed Forces and/or U.S. nuclear arsenal. Additionally the 
new legal opinion should explain that an attack on national infrastructure networks is 
especially relevant, and has the potential to result in immediate danger of death or 
serious physical injury as a result of a disruption, or corruption, of service to 
transportation, energy, or water services.  
3. FISA and CyberSpace as a Foreign Domain 
Another exemption that could be exploited by the drafters of a new EINSTEIN III 
legal opinion can be found in the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA. Unlike 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act which applies to electronic 
surveillance for domestic law enforcement purposes, FISA is applicable when the 
purpose of the surveillance is to gather foreign intelligence. FISA permits electronic 
surveillance and covert searches pursuant to court orders issued after a review by a 
special court of seven federal judges, the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). 
Under FISA, orders are granted if there is probable cause to believe that the monitored 
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party is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, and there is a showing of 
probable cause that the surveillance will uncover evidence of criminal activity (Solove, 
2006).   
If Cyberspace were to be considered Foreign and attacks derived from it 
committed by Foreign Powers, monitoring by EINSTIEN III IDS could be seen as legal, 
based on FISA provisions. Drafters of a new EINSTEIN III legal opinion should seek to 
incorporate an administrative declaration of Cyberspace being a foreign domain, and that 
as such, EINSTEIN III’s monitoring of network traffic be seen as legal and justified 
based on FISA provisions. Further if it is the intention of those administering EINSTEIN 
III to be able to use evidence captured as a result of EINTEIN III monitoring in court, a 
Federal Cyberspace Intelligence Surveillance Court (FCISC) should be established, and 
operated in much the same way as FISC, which permits electronic surveillance only after 
a review determines that there is probable cause to believe that the monitored party is a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power (Solove, 2006). FCISC, unlike FISC 
however, would have to make legal determination about the admissibility of cyber-attack 
evidence after it has already been captured and since Cyberspace will have been declared 
a foreign domain, a determination of whether the monitored party is a foreign power or 
an agent of a foreign power would not be necessary. 
4. Freedom of Speech and Intrusion upon Seclusion 
There are opposing arguments as to whether private ISPs should be required to 
participate in sharing of threat information or whether they should be incentavised to do 
so vountarily (Nojeim, 2010)(Greer, 2010). The issues of voluntary or mandated private 
company participation however, can only be addressed after the issue of illegal 
monitoring of innocent communications without consent is addressed; specifically, 
EINSTEIN III’s lack of protections from intrusion upon seclusion. As defined by the 
Restatement of Torts, intrusion upon seclusion is committed by, one who intentionally 
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private 
affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the 
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person (Harvard University, 2012). 
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Although it is unclear whether evidence obtained via EINSTEIN can be used in a trial, 
the technology does seem to intrude upon the seclusion, making DHS liable, even if there 
is no publication or other use of any kind of the information outlined (Harvard 
University, 2012). 
To remedy EINSTEIN III’s intrusion upon seclusion, drafters of a new EINTEIN 
legal opinion, and new privacy impact assesment, should acknowlege this limitation by 
establishing and publishing a procedure that ensures captured PII is never viewed by a 
human. Such technology should strip all private data from the offending communication 
and only allow the threat signature information to be used in an effort to prevent an 
ongoing attack. Additionally, the PII stripping process should be independently audited, 
and verifications published before EINTEIN III is deployed, and then again every year 
that it is in use. In this way intrusion upon seclusion can be prevented, and verification of 
its prevention made available to all EINSTEIN III participating ISP’s customers. 
5. The Special Needs Exemption 
A report published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) points out 
arguments in favor of applying the special needs exception to the EINSTEIN III program. 
The special needs exception states that, where Courts have held that there are special 
governmental needs, beyond normal law enforcement, the government may need neither 
a warrant nor any level of individualized suspicion. The CRS report gives as examples of 
such cases, the rules used to support sobriety roadblocks and border searches. The report 
suggests that an argument could be made that obtaining a warrant for a cyber-threat is 
impractical, and that since the purpose of the EINSTEIN program is beyond normal law 
enforcement, the application of the special needs doctrine to the EINSTEIN program may 
be justified (U.S. Library of Congress, 2012). This thesis supports the CRS belief that the 
EINSTEIN program is beyond normal law enforcement, and that the special needs 
doctrine does apply. Drafters of a new EINSTEIN III PIA should include an explanation 
of the special needs doctrine, and state specifically that, in part, this exemption provides 
for the legal execution of the EINSTEIN program.   
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C. THE SECURE IT ACT OF 2012 AND THE CYBERSECURITY ACT OF 
2012 
Both EPIC and CDT oppose provisions of the Strengthening and Enhancing 
Cybersecurity by Using Research, Education, Information, and Technology Act 
(SECURE IT), and the Cybersecurity Act of 2012 that proposes exemptions for 
information shared with or provided to cybersecurity centers, as well as the proposed 
exemptions that would specifically exempt from disclosure all cyber threat information 
shared with the government. Opposition stems from a broadly defined cyber threat 
information that could include a large amount of information unrelated to cybersecurity 
(Rotenberg, McCall, & Stepanovich, 2012).   
Additionally, both organizations believe that those Act’s provisions governing 
disclosure of information to law enforcement which state that a, cybersecurity exchange 
that is a Federal entity may disclose cybersecurity threat indicator (if) the information 
appears to relate to a crime which has been, is being, or is about to be committed would, 
essentially, allow the government to flag any activity which may indicate a potential 
crime; a practice that could potentially violate search and seizure rights protected by the 
4th amendment (Mills, 2012). Specifically, EPIC believes that the Acts fails to provide 
meaningful transparency and accountability protections, and that the handover of U.S. 
cybersecurity operations to the National Security Agency coupled with new exemptions 
from the Freedom of Information Act drastically limits public oversight necessary to 
prevent abuse and protect public privacy (Jackson, 2012).    
CDT is also critical of the Act’s FISMA reform provisions which authorizes 
federal agencies to share sensitive personally identifiable information (PII) with the 
Department of Homeland Security and also authorizes DHS to disclose that information 
for law enforcement purposes, and CDT believes that these provisions are specifically 
intended to facilitate operation of EINSTEIN (Center for Democracy & Technology, 
2012a). 
This thesis suggests that both the SECURE IT Act, and the Cybersecurity Act of 
2012 be re-drafted, and that in those drafts the definition of cybersecurity threat indicator 
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and/or cyber threat information be given in a clear and understandable manner, so that 
proper public scrutiny and oversight can prevent abuse of discretion (Rotenberg, McCall, 
& Stepanovich, 2012). This thesis also suggests that the SECURE IT Act and the 
Cybersecurity Act of 2012 be re-drafted to remove the provision that allows non-
cybersecurity information to be disclosed for law enforcement as well for national 
security purposes. Additionally the Act should include literature, that states specifically 
that any and all information obtained is only used for cybersecurity related issues, and 
that separate legislation is drafted that states specifically that the NSA be prohibited from 
accepting and/or soliciting Cybersecurity information form private organizations and 
individuals.  
D. SUMMARY 
Through the creation of an independent committee to conduct, or be a party to, 
weekly summaries and periodic reviews, the improper handling of PII would be limited. 
Additionally, the incorporation of remedial action procedures based on the Department of 
the Navy’s (DON) PII breach reporting procedures, and the publication of a redacted, 
classified PIA, would remove many concerns about PII being improperly handled. New 
legal opinions, based on current EINSTEIN III program capabilities would also 






 amendment rights are being protected, and the 
use of exemptions found in the, Federal Communications Act, Title III, and FISA can be 
used to form the legal basis for the employment of EINSTEIN III.  
To balance between the need to collect and use information, while also preserving 
individual rights, privacy protection application must be consistent across all federal 
activities (Koontz, 2008). To accomplish this, the SECURE IT Act, and the 
Cybersecurity Act of 2012, should be modified to better define, cybersecurity threat 
indicator and/or cyber threat information, and provision within them that allows non-
cybersecurity information to be disclosed for law enforcement and national security 
purposes be removed. Additionally the Acts should include literature, that states that all 
information obtained be used for cybersecurity related issues only, and that the NSA is 
prohibited from accepting and/or soliciting Cybersecurity information form private 
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organizations and individuals. By doing so, the Department of Homeland Security should 
strengthen public confidence in their ability to moderate the trade-off between defending 
the nation’s system of computer networks, and protecting individual rights  
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
Concerns surrounding the privacy implications of the EINSTEIN program, and 
pending legislation that appears to lay the legal groundwork for it, are well documented. 
Private individuals and civil rights organizations are specifically concerned with potential 
mistaken capture of communications, the potential misuse of personal information, and 
the effects of such monitoring on free speech (Center For Democracy & Technology, 
2009). The theme that underpins most concerns is that the program’s secrecy alone 
undermines the effectiveness of cybersecurity efforts, especially where the government is 
cooperating with private sector companies (Center For Democracy & Technology, 2009). 
In attempts to lift the veil of secrecey, several privacy and civil rights advocates have 
challenged the legitimacy of recent cybersecurity regulations and policies (Shaw, 2010).  
If the policy document, Privacy Impact Assessments for the Initiative three 
Exercise (EINSTEIN), is to be improved, its drafters must address specific privacy 
concerns head-on. New technologies such as the EINSTEIN III IDS will, no doubt, 
continue to bring about questions surrounding privacy, and while it is true that no amount 
of research, policy or legal precedent will ever be the final answer to the question of 
privacy, the past must be deeply ingrained in future solutions (Solove, 2008). 
Incorporating answers to as many specific privacy concerns as possible is essential for 
public acceptance of such invasive technologies, and is what has to be done in all future 
policy documents surrounding the EINSTEIN III, IDS  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Through in-depth analysis of existing DHS documents, Privacy Impact 
Assessments for the Initiative three Exercise (Einstein), Legality of Intrusion-Detection 
System to Protect Unclassified Computer Networks in the Executive Branch, and Legal 
Issues relating to the Testing, Use, and Deployment of an Intrusion-Detection System 
(EINSTEIN 2.0) to Protect Unclassified Computer Networks in the Executive Branch, this 
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thesis offers strategies to address privacy concerns with the implementation of the 
EINSTEIN III initiative. 
By reviewing current privacy policy and past privacy case studies, in addition to 
careful analysis of federal court cases and statutes, the fundamental and constitutional 
right to privacy has been established. Research has identified elements and exemptions of 
current communications legislation that can be used in the development of a 
comprehensive cyberspace monitoring policy. Recommendations have been made for the 
drafting of a new EINSTEIN III PIA, as well a new legal opinion that balances the trade-
off between privacy rights and the objectives of securing cyberspace, and that establishes 
a proper legal foundation. Drafting of these policies is necessary in moving forward with 
the exercise, and ultimately to the implementation of the network security system. The 
Department of Homeland Security should follow these recommendations as a means of 
bolstering public confidence in their ability to moderate the trade-off between defending 
the nation’s system of computer networks, and protecting individual rights.  
C. RECOMMENDED FURTHER RESEARCH 
Because the EINSTEIN program is ongoing, further research should be conducted 
as the program matures and evolves. Existing policies that impact privacy are updated, 
and new policies drafted, that ultimately alter the effects on privacy that programs like 
EINSTEIN have. As lawmakers work to improve the correlation between privacy laws 
and the expectations of the countries citizenry, so should the developers of the 
EINSTEIN III IDS.   
The research conducted for this thesis was secondary, and was conducted through 
examination of EINSTEIN at the unclassified level. Further research should include 
primary research, in which the opinions of those opposed to the EINSTEIN III IDS are 
collected via interviews and/or questionnaires. Additionally the developers of the 
technology, and more importantly the writers of the technologies’ privacy oriented 
policies, should be interviewed to better understand the reasoning behind some of the 
important decisions pointed out in this thesis, such as the re-use of the  EINSTEIN II 
Legal Opinion, and the lack of redress and remediation procedures. It is possible that 
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many of the decisions surrounding the EINSTEIN program were made as a result of the 
necessarily secretive nature of the technology, and that further research conducted at a 
security level high enough to allow for candid and comprehensive responses to research 
questions might reveal relevant information regarding the EINSTEIN program.  
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